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The purpose of this work is to analyse the discount to NAV phenomenon in the Italian market, 
using some selected listed holding companies as reference.  
A holding company can be defined as “a professionally managed institution owing a portfolio 
of stocks in public and private companies with the purpose of influencing them. In realising this 
objective, a holding company acts both as a financial intermediary and as an active shareholder” 
(Banerjee et al., 1997). Since holding companies are characterized by operations through 
different subsidiaries and associates, they are typically valued using a Sum-of-the-Parts method, 
i.e. evaluating each segment as it were broken up and spun off or acquired by another company 
and then calculating the whole enterprise value by summing up the valuations of the individual 
parts. The Net Asset Value (NAV) reflects the sum of the estimated values of the assets in the 
portfolio of the holding company minus its net debt. In the market, a deviation of the holding 
companies’ market capitalization from their NAV has been observed, and such deviation is 
referred to as discount to NAV if the company’s stocks are traded at a price lower than its NAV. 
In the first chapter, an overview about holding companies as a corporate governance tool is 
provided. In particular, focusing on the Italian market, holding companies have traditionally 
played an important role in corporate finance and constituted a distinctive feature of the Italian 
corporate system since the beginning of the 20th century. Typical characteristics of Italian 
holding companies are ownership concentration and the adoption of a pyramidal structure; at 
the head of such structure there is usually a controlling family able to amplify its control and 
influence area with a reduced amount of investments through the use of a control chain.  
After this overview, the chapter continues with a review of the existing literature about the 
discount to NAV phenomenon. In doing this, studies and researches on closed-end funds 
discount have been taken into consideration, as research about the “holding companies’ 
discount” phenomenon has been sparse so far. These studies investigating the closed-end funds’ 
discount to NAV phenomenon are based on two different approaches: the rational approach 
and the noise trader approach. The rational approach is based on the idea that the discount to 
NAV is linked to several company’s specific factors, e.g. agency problem, lack of liquidity, 
diversification, leverage, operating costs and managerial performance. The noise trader 
approach suggests that discount to NAV and its variation over time are also caused by the 
presence of noise traders in the market and by the changes in investors sentiment. 
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In the second chapter, the study of the discount to NAV phenomenon is performed through the 
analysis of some listed Italian holding companies, i.e. Exor, Italmobiliare, CIR, IMMSI and 
Tamburi Investment Partners, during the 2009-2017 period. In particular, for each holding 
company, the following aspects have been investigated: 
-   the dynamics and the reasons behind the NAV evolution over the years, trying to 
understand the impact of the business strategy, i.e. the market performance of the 
underlying listed assets in the portfolio, and the corporate strategy, i.e. the management 
“activism” in managing the asset portfolio; 
-   how the market has changed its valuation about the holding companies during the 
reference period. The discount to NAV dynamic and its key factors have therefore been 
analysed by comparing the market capitalization to the NAV;  
-   the holding companies’ ability to generate value for their shareholders, in the light of 
the discount to NAV existence. For this purpose, the annualized Total Shareholder 
Return delivered during the reference period has been taken into consideration, trying 
to understand the impact of the performance of the underlying listed assets in the 




Chapter 1 – Holding companies’ valuation and discount to NAV 
1.1 Holding companies: an overview 
A holding company can be defined as “a professionally managed institution owing a portfolio 
of stocks in public and private companies with the purpose of influencing them. In realising this 
objective, a holding company acts both as a financial intermediary and as an active shareholder” 
(Banerjee et al., 1997). 
The study of holding companies as a corporate governance tool is part, in the economic 
literature, of the study of business groups. Business groups are, traditionally, the typical legal 
form adopted by large corporations all over the world to conduct their business thanks to the 
bonds with subsidiaries and associated companies and the single company operating without 
equity ties with other firms is only applied to small enterprises (Zattoni, 1999). The business 
groups, according to Colpan and Hikino (2010), can be classified in two basic and distinct types. 
The first one is the network-type business group, based on the alliance behavioural principle 
assumed by the constituent companies: in this case, the business group is composed by legally 
independent companies that act for reaching common long-term goals, excluding the existence 
of an individual’s dominant control over budgetary and strategic decisions for the whole group. 
The second type is referred to as hierarchy-type business group, organized by the authority 
principle, in which there is a dominant shareholder at the top (which could be a family, an 
entrepreneur or an holding company), several companies at the bottom, where most of the 
operational activities are located, and a chain of holdings and sub-holdings in the middle, 
through which control is exercised, creating in this way a pyramidal structure (Bianchi and 
Bianco, 2006).  
The reasons behind the choice of adopting the business group form are many and strongly 
dependent on the aims pursued by the actors participating in the group who determine the 
establishment method and the characteristics of the group itself. Among the most common 
reasons, reference can be made to the possibility to pursue strategies of diversification and 
internationalization, the opportunity to realize economies coming from the centralization of 
management and organization services as well as scope and scale economies1 but also, typically 
in the groups vertically integrated, economies in the transaction costs and the chance to exploit 
                                               
1 Economy of scope is the cost advantage a company has with the increased variety of complementary goods 
produced; economy of scale is the cost advantage a company has with the increased volume of goods produced. 
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financial opportunities. In particular, with regard to the latter and vertical groups, the most 
significant financial opportunities are the possibility to amplify the control and influence area 
with a reduced amount of investments through the use of a control chain, as well as the 
possibility to increase debt capacity thanks to a superior level of resources to guarantee 
creditors. Moreover, because of the separate economic subjectivity of the holding company, it 
appears as a third party in the legal relationships established by the individual subsidiaries so 
that any creditor claim burdens the latter and not the holding company.  
The adoption of a business group form is also linked to a greater complexity of structure. This 
is more evident in the hierarchy-type business groups, which involves several entities: 
-­‐   Parent company or holding: economic entity having the power of controlling, at 
decisional and administrative level, all the other companies of the group; 
-­‐   Subsidiaries: economic entities over which the holding company exercises a dominant 
influence as it owns, directly or indirectly, the whole or the majority of the shares; 
-­‐   Affiliates: economic entities over which the holding company directly or indirectly 
exercises a significant influence.  
Maintaining the focus on the holding company and discriminating for the type and nature of the 
activity realized, in the economic literature we typically find a distinction among:  
-   Pure / Financial holding where the holding company does not implement any operating 
activity but it is only responsible for managing investments and financial resources, as 
well as for guiding and coordinating group corporate policies; 
-   Mixed / Industrial holding where the holding company, in addition to the management 
of investments and financial resources and the coordination of group strategies, also 
carries out operational activities aimed at manufacturing and marketing goods. 
Frequently, business groups are characterized by the listing of many companies at different 
levels of the chain and the holding company at the top of the pyramid may also be listed so it is 
interesting to try to understand which is the logic and which are the main pros and cons for an 
holding company to go public (Vecchio et al., 2012). Among the advantages, it is possible to 
mention a higher visibility of the company also at an international level, a greater transparency 
of the company’s value - given by an easier access to information for the investors (e.g. IFRS 
accounts, financial analyst monitor, etc.), which is further enhanced if the underlying assets are 
also listed - a superior management retention, an easier access to the capital market and to the 
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funding from banks. With regard to the disadvantages, the most important are the listing costs, 
the duty of dealing with minorities and the limits imposed by the authorities to some M&A 
transactions.   
1.2 Italian holding companies 
The focus of this work is on the Italian market and holding companies have traditionally played 
an important role in corporate finance and constituted a distinctive feature of the Italian 
corporate system. In fact, since the beginning of the 20th century, Italian large companies tended 
to organize themselves as complex structures, characterized by coordination and network 
frameworks, which allowed the owners at the top of the organization to keep control over their 
companies with a limited amount of investment, thus configuring a hierarchical business group 
structure. Such a framework was used by companies as a tool to support their growth, 
characterised since the beginning by a strong tendency towards the sequential constitution of 
equity ties between different companies, rather than by an organic approach (Colli et al., 2016). 
In Italy, the diffusion of this type of organizational structure having the ownership concentration 
as main characteristic, was also favoured by the limited dimension and development of the 
stock market, which is connected to a low investor protection guaranteed by the law: in this 
environment companies are less able to sell equity to small shareholders, thus favouring 
ownership concentration. This correlation is demonstrated by the fact that in the 1990s, which 
were characterized by a more strict regulation of traded companies and the stock market, it is 
possible to observe a reduction in ownership concentration and pyramiding compared to the 
previous decades of the 20th century (Aganin and Volpin, 2003). Another relevant element to 
be considered is an over-time simplification of the structure of pyramidal groups realized with 
a reduction of the chain length (Bianchi and Bianco, 2006). 
Furthermore, a distinctive feature of large Italian firms is that, in the majority of the cases, the 
main shareholder is a group of people belonging to the same family (Zattoni, 1999) so this 
structure can also be used to plan a generational pass since it allows to split power and 
responsibilities across the members of the family, limiting the conflicts among them (Colli et 
al., 2016). Through the adoption of a pyramidal structure at the head of which there is a holding 
company, the controlling family is able to achieve control of the maximum possible number of 
operating companies with the lowest amount of capital investment (the so called stock 
pyramiding effect). This means, for instance, that a family that owns 50% of a firm, which in 
turn owns 50% of another firm, achieves the control of the latter with a share of only 25%   
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(50% * 50%). In general terms, the amount of investment that the controlling shareholder has 
to make in order to control the assets is inversely proportional to the number of levels created: 
the higher is the number of subsidiaries, the lower will be the investment required (Zattoni, 
1999).  
With this mechanism, especially in listed companies, it is possible to achieve a separation 
between ownership and control that in the economic literature may have a double interpretation 
(Di Carlo, 2013). If we consider an opportunistic view, which is based on the agency theory2, 
the controlling shareholder at the top of the chain may be incentivised to reroute the resources 
in order to extract private benefits at the expenses of the minorities. This phenomenon is 
typically known as tunneling (La Porta et al., 2000). This process is facilitated also by the fact 
that the controlling shareholder often controls the composition of the board of directors: a very 
common situation is the presence of members of the controlling family in the subsidiaries’ 
boards, thus questioning the real board independence and separation between control and 
direction. If we consider instead an efficient view, this structure allows to create value for all 
the subsidiaries thanks to a network organization that reduces the transaction costs and gives 
the possibility to achieve scope and scale economies because of the centralization of certain 
corporate functions. 
Large Italian groups are also characterized by the listing of many companies under their control. 
As defined by Bianchi and Bianco (2006), “a listed group includes all the companies (listed and 
not listed) which are linked by a control relationship to the listed company, i.e. those that control 
or are controlled by the listed company itself” (see fig. 1). The presence of more than one listed 
company in a group may suggest a possibly high separation between ownership and control 
since there is a greater involvement of minority shareholders in the ownership and this is even 
more enhanced if the listed companies are at different levels of the chain of control (Bianchi 
and Bianco, 2006). These listings has several financial benefits for the controlling family: they 
allow the collection of capital thanks to the sale in the market of shares that are not necessary 
for exercising control, they may be used to rise funds in the future by implementing capital 
increases which can also be realized in a subsidiary with a good performance in order to solve 
financial crises in another group’s firm (Zattoni, 1999).  
                                               
2 An agency relationship is “a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person 
(the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to 
the agent. If both parties to the relationship are utility maximizers, there is good reason to believe that the agent 
will not always act in the best interests of the principal” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Type I agency problem arises between the owner of the company and the manager; Type II agency problem is 
between the controlling shareholder and the minorities. 
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Fig. 1 – The identification of the business group. For each company, the fraction of the cash flow rights (CFR) of 
the ultimate owner is indicated and it is calculated by multiplying the ownership stakes held by each company 
along the control chain. Source: E. Di Carlo (2013) 
 
1.2.1   Legal aspects 
The regulation of holding companies in Italy is part of the regulation of business groups 
described above as a typical structure of the Italian entrepreneurial system. Traditionally, the 
problem of business groups is considered a problem of protection of minority shareholders and 
creditors of the subsidiaries but it is also, in broader terms, a problem of reconstruction of a 
“right of organization” for the companies belonging to a business group. 
The regulatory framework has profoundly changed with the corporate law reform in 2003, 
which introduced for the first time in the Italian legal system a discipline of business groups 
(cf. articles 2497 et seq. of the Italian Civil Code). The first subject of the discipline is the 
activity of direction and coordination exercised by the holding company. The meaning of 
“activity of direction and coordination” has not been explicitly stated by the legislator but it 
may be interpreted as the actual exercise of power of a company in directing and coordinating 
other companies based on a unified project through the organization, and not necessarily 
centralization, of one or more essential functions. According to art. 2497-sexies, the activity of 
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direction and coordination is exercised by the company or body required to consolidate the 
financial statements3 or by the controlling company under art. 23594, which defines the 
principles to distinguish subsidiaries from affiliates. 
According to art. 2497, paragraph 1, the holding has to act in compliance with the principles of 
“fair corporate and business management” . A violation of these principles exposes the parent 
company to a liability for damages directly towards the shareholders and creditors of the 
subsidiary. 
Moreover, art. 2497-bis requires the subsidiaries to disclose their membership in a business 
group in order to indicate to shareholders and third parties whether the company operates in an 
“autonomous” entrepreneurial context or in a “group” structure and this distinction is relevant 
in terms of different risk conditions of the economic activity. The article aims to also guarantee 
the transparency of the activity of direction and coordination, stating that the directors have to 
indicate, in the management report, their relationships with the company who exercises the 
activity of direction and coordination as well as with the other companies subjected to it, 
pointing out the effect that this activity has had on operations and results. There is also a specific 
obligation to motivate the decisions influenced by the activity of direction of coordination, i.e. 
by the membership in a business group (art. 2497-ter). 
With regards to the business groups’ fiscal aspects, there are two particular regulatory 
provisions: the participation exemption and the consolidato fiscale. Participation exemption 
(Pex) is disciplined by art. 87 of Presidential Decree No. 917/86 which provides for a 95% 
fiscal exemption of the capital gains realized with the sale of investments, in case certain 
requirements are met: 1) the participation must be held continuously for at least twelve months; 
2) the participation must be classified as a financial fixed asset in the first closed balance sheet 
during the period of possession; 3) the investee company must be resident in a country other 
than those with a privileged tax regime; 4) the investee company must carry out a commercial 
activity under art. 55 of Presidential Decree No. 917/86.  
The consolidato fiscale is disciplined by art. 117-129 of Presidential Decree No. 917/86 which 
establishes, in case of compliance with certain requirements, the taxation of the total income of 
                                               
3 Consolidated financial statements are regulated by the national legislation with the principle OIC 17 and by the 
international accounting standards with the IFRS 10. 
4 The art. 2359 defines subsidiaries the ones in which the parent company 1) holds the majority of the votes in the 
ordinary assembly; 2) holds sufficient votes to exercise a dominant influence in the ordinary assembly; 3) exercises 
a dominant influence by virtue of contractual agreements on the management of the investee companies. The 
affiliates are those on which the parent company exercises a significant influence, i.e. at least one-fifth of the votes 
in the ordinary assembly or one-tenth if the company has shares listed on regulated markets.  
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a group as deriving from the sum of the taxable income of the individual investee companies. 
Several are the advantages connected to the adoption of this scheme: 1) the dividends 
distributed among the participating companies are not considered in the formation of the total 
group’s income; 2) the opportunity to offset tax credits and benefits between the different 
companies included in the “scope of consolidation”; 3) the possibility to offset gains and losses 
realized by the different companies in the same financial year in order to determinate the total 
taxable income, potentially realizing a tax shield. 
With regard to dividend taxation, art. 89 of Presidential Decree No. 917/86 establishes that 
dividends are taxable for 5% of their amount.   
1.3 Holding companies’ valuation: the Sum-of-the-Parts approach 
The Sum-of-the-Parts approach, also called Break-Up analysis, is a valuation method typically 
used by analysts to value conglomerates, multi-divisional companies and holding companies. 
Since these forms of organization are characterized by operations through different divisions 
and subsidiaries, this method consists in evaluating each segment as it were broken up and spun 
off or acquired by another company. The whole enterprise value is then calculated by summing 
up the valuations of the individual parts. Alternative and most common valuation methods 
would be the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF analysis) and the trading multiples approach but the 
Sum-of-the-Parts method seems to be the best valuation alternative in these cases because: 
-   Given the “hybrid” nature of the holdings, with investee companies usually operating 
and competing in market segments characterized by different economic characteristics, 
the application of a unique cost of capital in the DCF approach or the use of a single-
sector multiple would not offer deep insights into the sources and the drivers through 
which the company is generating value, while a SoP approach would allow a more 
accurate picture; 
-   By valuing the assets separately, it is possible to guarantee a greater flexibility in the 
process, which allows to maintain the holding companies’ structure up to date taking 
into account the changes in their portfolios, and transparency from the analyst, who has 
to present and justify the value calculated for each single part and the subsequent 
expression of a target price and outlook. 
The valuation of each single part can be performed using different methods, as for example a 
mark-to-market approach, typically utilised for the listed companies, a DCF approach applying 
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different costs of capital, which reflect different systematic risks of the operating cash flows 
and their ability to support the debt, or a multiples approach, selecting an appropriate peer group 
which is closely comparable in terms of sector but also in terms of return on capital and growth 
path. Whenever possible, it is also appropriate to triangulate the results coming from the DCF 
method with the ones obtained with multiples of peers in order to test the valuation.  
1.4 Holding companies’ discount to NAV 
Net Asset Value (NAV) reflects the sum of the estimated values of the assets in the portfolio of 
the holding company minus its net debt. As a result, holding companies’ share prices should 
reflect this value. However the existence of a deviation of the holding companies’ market 
capitalization from their NAV has been observed, and such deviation is referred to as discount 
/ premium to NAV.  
This deviation is measured on a percentage basis and expressed as: 
Discount / Premium =	  𝑀𝑘𝑡	  𝑐𝑎𝑝 − 𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑁𝐴𝑉 × 100	   
In particular, if the company’s stocks are traded at a price lower than its NAV, a discount is 
observed; if the company’s stocks are traded at a price higher than its NAV, a premium is 
registered (see fig. 2). 
               














In the market it is possible to observe that holding companies trade very often at discount, rather 
than at premium. So far, research about the “holding companies’ discount” phenomenon has 
been sparse, while there are several studies and researches about a similar issue observed for 
the closed-end funds. For this reason, in order to try to find explanations for the drivers of the 
discount to NAV in holding companies, it is possible to compare the latter to closed-end funds. 
Closed-end funds are publicly listed investment companies which invest funds in a portfolio of 
stocks and other securities of companies in order to realize profits. Unlike open-end funds, 
closed-end funds have a fixed, i.e. “closed”, capitalization, meaning that they only issue a set 
amount of shares, which are not redeemable. Furthermore, closed-end funds’ shares are offered 
through an IPO and thereafter traded on the open market, just like an individual stock, so the 
price is affected by the investors’ supply and demand for the shares. This characteristic 
determines the possibility to sell either at a premium or at a discount to NAV, which does not 
happen in open-end funds, whose shares are directly bought from, and sold to, the fund and the 
price is fixed at their NAV. 
In the comparison between holding companies and closed-end funds, it is important to point 
out a relevant difference existing among the two: the former has the objective to actively control 
and manage the companies in which it has a stake, whereas the latter is intended to only make 
profits from buying and selling shares. 
The studies investigating the closed-end funds’ discount to NAV phenomenon are based on two 
different approaches: the rational approach and the noise trader approach. The rational 
approach is based on the idea that the discount to NAV is linked to several company’s specific 
factors. The noise trader approach suggests that discount to NAV and its variation over time 
are also caused by the presence of noise traders in the market and by the changes in investors 
sentiment. 
1.4.1 Rational approach 
The rational approach assumes that the discount to NAV is related to multiple specific factors 
characterizing the holding companies. In this section, in the light of past studies and the relevant 




Holding companies, as already explained, are frequently organized in a pyramidal structure and 
therefore are characterized by a strong separation between ownership and control, which is 
connected to the legal minority’s protection issue. In this context a possible principal-agent 
problem appears between the controlling shareholder and the minorities: the controlling 
shareholder at the top of the pyramid may be incentivised to transfer the resources and assets 
of the companies along the chain in order to extract private benefits, to the detriment of 
minorities. This phenomenon is typically known as tunneling (La Porta et al., 2000). It is 
connected to pecuniary benefits but it can also be the case that controlling shareholders take 
advantage of their position in order to extract non pecuniary benefits, such as the promotion of 
the family pride and reputation (Barclay et al., 1993). 
Because of this mismatch in the interests of controlling and non-controlling shareholders and 
because of the power and the incentive that controlling shareholders could have to divert the 
resources for personal interests, the non-controlling shareholders will require a price discount 
when they buy the stocks in a holding company, in order to be compensated for the expected 
loss from expropriation. The discount to NAV can be thus partially explained by this 
anticipation of minorities of being expropriated by the controlling shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Barontini and Siciliano, 2003). Barclay et al. (1993) also support with their 
study this idea of a strong and systematic positive correlation between block-ownership and 
discount to NAV. 
Lack of liquidity  
The fact that holding companies are characterized by ownership concentration determinates a 
limited amount of floating capital in the market. This is consequently connected to a low trading 
volume of these floating shares, which therefore will configure a less liquid market. Liquidity 
describes the extent to which an asset or a security can be easily bought and sold in the market 
with limited or no effect on the price. In the event of a low level of liquidity, there is a relatively 
limited number of potential buyers and the search costs, associated with finding these buyers, 
are high. Moreover, low liquidity is connected to a higher risk of assets mispricing, meaning a 
situation in which the market price of stocks does not fairly reflect their value. The combination 
of these two elements characterizing illiquid markets, makes it possible to consider the lack of 
liquidity as positively correlated to the presence of the discount to NAV (Malkiel, 1977; Adams 
and Venmore-Rowland, 1990). 
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It is also important to take into account that the concept of lack of liquidity is not only related 
to ownership concentration but it also depends on the composition of the holding companies’ 
portfolio. Should the portfolio be also composed by unlisted companies, that by their nature are 
illiquid assets, the shareholders investing in the holding’s shares, would have the possibility to 
indirectly have access to these private businesses. However, at the same time, the market might 
assign a discount to the holding company’s shares because of the difficulty possibly 
experienced by the holding in finding a buyer, in case of these assets being liquidated 
(Damodaran, 2005). 
Diversification 
Diversification allows to reduce the risk exposure of a portfolio of assets, as theorized by 
Markovitz’s Portfolio Theory. The application of this concept to holding companies would 
mean that a diversification of the portfolio of investments would reduce risk as the dependence 
on a single sector of activity or a single country is lowered. Moreover, the investment in a 
holding company allows a shareholder to get access to a diversified equity portfolio at 
potentially lower transaction costs compared to the case in which the investor has to create it 
on his own.  
Diversification in a holding company also allows to create an internal capital market in which 
the holding allocates the capital to the different investee companies and, as pointed out by 
Gertner et al. (1994), the main consequences and advantages compared to the external capital 
markets (e.g. the bond market, the stock market, banks and financial companies) are increased 
monitoring incentives on the utilization of the funds and a better assets redeployability, meaning 
the possibility to easily shift funds or assets from one project/unit to another. The creation of 
an internal capital market, thanks to a diversified structure, appears to be particularly efficient 
in periods during which capital markets are more volatile because the exceeding cash flows 
from a division can be used to finance other divisions of the same company, thus reducing 
dependence on the external market (Dell’Acqua et al., 2013).  
Additionally, a diversified portfolio allows to minimize tax burdens by offsetting the gains of a 
subsidiary with the loss realized in another subsidiary, so as to create an immediate tax 
advantage rather than carrying it forward for future years (Berger and Ofek, 1995).  
Based on the considerations above, it would seem that holding companies should trade at a 
premium (Adams and Venmore-Rowland, 1990) but in reality several studies have pointed out 
that, in most cases, diversification can be considered a cause of discount to NAV. This discount 
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deriving from the diversification process is usually called conglomerate discount because it is 
typically applied by the market to conglomerates and multi-divisional firms, which are 
characterized by their operation in different sectors.  
First of all, reference can be made to the fact that the market considers the potential agency 
costs, the implementation risk, the additional complexity and consequently the lower 
transparency connected to the diversification process. An excessive diversification would 
indeed make it more difficult to find quality investments and, above all, to deeply understand 
and effectively manage and monitor them. On the contrary, holding companies with a more 
focused portfolio would realize gains from specialization. This could be considered a reason 
why in recent years conglomerates have conduct extensive restructuring operations in order to 
refocus on the core business. The typical benefits connected to a restructuring process through 
a spin-off operation are the realization of a more efficient investment policy, a superior 
transparency in the company disclosure, the possibility to attract new investors which prefer to 
focus their investments on a specific sector and the redefinition of a financial policy and a 
shareholder distribution policy, which are more appropriate for the different businesses and the 
different growth targets (Dell’Acqua et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, in literature there is evidence that diversified companies destroy value because 
internal capital markets are inefficient. This is related to the idea of the cross-subsidization of 
failing segments (Cronqvist et al, 2001; Berger and Ofek, 1995), in other words,  the situation 
in which the holding company shifts the funds from one performing subsidiary to a more 
inefficient one, usually motivated by private benefits that can be extracted through this 
operation by the controlling shareholders. Berger and Ofek (1995) in their study also observe 
that cross-subsidization determines a smaller loss in value in case of a related diversification 
compared to a situation of an unrelated one5.  
This concept of related diversification is also considered in the study of Dell’Acqua et al. (2013) 
about the variation of discount considering the degree of correlation between the business 
segments. They conclude that the discount is higher when there is an unrelated diversification 
as extracting the benefits from diversification would be more difficult. In their study the 
influence of the company divisions’ growth profile is also considered: when it is substantially 
different, divisions frequently compete to obtain the limited resources and the “high growth 
                                               
5 Related diversification is the case when conglomerates operate through correlated business segments; unrelated 
diversification is the case when conglomerates operate through business segments in different and not correlated 
markets. The distinction is done on the basis of the SIC code: unrelated diversification is when segments have 
different SIC codes at the two-digit level (Berger and Ofek, 1995). 
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divisions” could be at a disadvantage compared to the bigger divisions which operate in mature 
markets even if the latter present less profitable investment opportunities.  
Cronqvist et al. (2001), with their analysis of Swedish real estate corporations, have also 
introduced the idea of the existence of an ex ante diversification discount, i.e. the discount 
applied to firms that are expected to adopt a non-focused strategy, and it appeared to be even 
bigger and more important than the one applied to an already diversified firm. The existence of 
the ex ante discount is motivated by the fact that investors anticipate the costs connected to the 
diversification process and apply a discount due to the uncertainty of making synergistic gains 
from diversification. 
Leverage 
Financial leverage topic is connected to diversification since diversification increases the 
corporate debt capacity because it creates an “insurance effect”, coming from the possibility for 
the holding company to use the excess cash from one of the subsidiaries in case of need (Melnik 
and Pollatschek, 1973). As a result, we observe a reduction in the cost of borrowing. 
The main advantage of borrowing is related to the interest tax shield effect, being the interests 
on debt tax deductible. However, it is important to bear in mind that financial leverage allows 
an increase in the value of the firm only up to a certain level, corresponding to the optimal debt 
to equity ratio, beyond which the value of the company, and the connected shareholders’ wealth, 
starts to drop due to the increase of the present value of financial distress costs; as a result we 
have an increased risk and consequently a higher cost of debt. For these reasons, as long as the 
rate of return from the holding’s portfolio is greater than the cost of debt, additional leverage 
can be advantageous (Adams and Venmore-Rowland, 1990). 
The effect of leverage on discount to NAV is therefore controversial and uncertain, as it depends 
on the borrowing level as well as on balance between advantages and disadvantages of gearing. 
A different  perspective is assumed by Adams and Venmore-Rowland (1990). In their study, 
they use the Modigliani and Miller proposition on capital structure, which states that the total 
value of a company does not depend on its capital structure, to affirm that financial leverage is 
not a determinant of NAV discount / premium, but it can rather be considered an amplifier of 
NAV discount / premium created by other factors. 
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Operating costs  
Using the holding company as a corporate governance tool is connected to several benefits 
related to the potential creation of value for the shareholders but, at the same time, it will also 
generate costs. In view of the trade-off, if the expenses exceed the benefits, this would 
determine the existence of a discount to NAV (Kumar and Noronha, 1992). 
We are going to focus now on the potential advantages: firstly, holding companies can improve 
managerial efficiency in the subsidiaries and affiliates by supplying professional advices and 
coordinating the whole group based on a uniform vision. Secondly, holding companies can also 
allow to improve operating efficiency by offering the opportunity to reach scope and scale 
economies, thus lowering the costs for the whole group. Thirdly, the holding company can take 
advantage of some legal regulations on taxes, e.g. the tax shield obtained thanks to a loss making 
subsidiary.  
With regard to the drawbacks, there are several operating costs involved in running a holding 
company, usually connected to the complexity of this organizational structure. This determines 
the necessity to implement monitoring activities that can be very expensive and the holding 
company may not always be able to engage appropriately in these activities for each controlled 
company. Other expenses may be related to management fees.  
Managerial performance 
The expected managerial performance can be considered as related to discount / premium to 
NAV. Usually, past investment performance is considered as a good proxy, although no 
guarantee, of future performance: holding companies presenting a past internal rate of return 
which is lower than their cost of capital, will be subject to a higher discount to NAV because it 
is considered a signal of potential non-value creation also for the future (Malkiel, 1977; Vecchio 
et al., 2012). 
1.4.2 Noise trader approach 
The explanations for the discount to NAV connected to firm-specific factors given by the 
rational approach have been considered, in literature, as not much explanatory, especially in 
relation to the reasons why discount varies so much over time. Considering this lack of 
explanatory power of the model, the noise trader approach has been introduced: it links the 
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discount to NAV to the investor sentiment, in addition to the company’s specific factors 
examined in the previous section. This model is associated with the works on the close-end 
funds of De Long et al. (1990) and of Lee et al. (1991). 
The noise trader approach is based on the idea that the investors present on the market fall into 
one of two distinct categories. On the one hand there are the rational traders, i.e. professional 
investors who trade on the basis of the information about fundamentals; on the other hand, there 
are the noise traders, which are non-professional or irrational investors who have no 
competences and access to information allowing them to undertake a fundamental analysis and 
hence they trade on market sentiment, that is on the basis of the information available and 
considering their own sentiment, instinct and incorrect believes.  
De Long et al. (1990) model is based on two crucial assumptions: firstly, they assume that 
rational investors are risk averse and have a short investment horizon; secondly, the noise trader 
sentiment is stochastic so it cannot be perfectly predicted by rational investors. As a result, 
rational investors are not able to forecast whether noise traders will be optimistic or pessimistic 
at the time when they will decide to liquidate their investment: in case noise traders will have a 
bearish sentiment, prices will be undervalued and rational investors might not be able to sell an 
asset as prices are too low and the discount has widened. This means that the noise traders’ 
influence cannot be arbitraged away by a rational investor buying the fund selling at discount 
and selling short its portfolio. This is due to the fact that in case the investor wants to liquidate 
his position and the discount has increased since the time when the arbitrage strategy has been 
put in place, the arbitrageur would suffer a loss. It is this unpredictability of sentiment’s change, 
and not the presence of pessimistic investors per se, that determines an additional risk to the 
one inherent to the company’s portfolio and therefore the existence of average discounts.  
The variations in discounts to NAV are then explained by the fluctuations in investor sentiment, 
which thus determines fluctuations in the demand for the closed-end fund shares. In this model, 
the investor sentiment risk is assumed to be systematic, meaning it affects several securities at 
the same time, included, but not limited to, the closed-end funds; the investor sentiment reflects 
then market-wide expectations and not closed-end fund specific ones. 
Lee et al. (1991) further investigate this topic and add elements to the previously presented 
model, shifting the connection of the closed-end fund discount to an individual investor 
sentiment. In particular, they assume that noise traders predominately hold and trade closed-
end fund’s stocks, as it offers a security substitution, while institutional investors (i.e. the 
rational ones) are more likely to invest in the fund’s underlying assets. As a result, holding the 
closed-end fund’s shares is riskier than holding the underlying assets directly because the 
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former are subject to the additional noise trader risk. The presence of such risk implies that 
closed-end funds shares should have a higher required return than the underlying assets and 
therefore they will be priced at discount to their NAV. Lee et al. use the discount in closed-end 
funds as “a proxy for changes in individual investor sentiment” and conclude “that the same 
sentiment affects returns on smaller capitalization and other stocks held and traded by 
individual investors”, meaning that also smaller stocks should be undervalued in the market. 
The same logic can be true for holding companies (Rommens et al., 2004). 
In studying the fluctuations of the discount to NAV, there is also evidence of a mean-reverting 
tendency, i.e. a situation in which the disequilibrium between share price and NAV fluctuates 
around its mean value (De Long et al., 1990; Lee et al., 1991; Gasbarro et al., 2003). Gasbarro 
et al. (2003) in their study find out that mean-reversion is fund specific and that excess returns 
may be generated only if mean-reversion is primarily driven by changes in share price rather 









Chapter 2 – Italian holdings: case studies 
2.1 Methodology 
The focus of this work is on the discount to NAV in the Italian market. The analysis is conducted 
for pure / financial holdings, which are, differently from the mixed / industrial holdings, the 
most comparable to the closed-end funds, since their activity consists in managing investments 
and financial resources as well as coordinating group corporate policies, without carrying out 
any operational activity. The listed Italian holding companies taken into consideration in this 
work are Exor, Italmobiliare, CIR, Immsi and Tamburi Investment Partners. 
In the previous section, we have reviewed the existing literature about some possible 
explanations to closed-end funds’ discount to NAV, highlighting the fact that the same reasons 
may be applied to holding companies. The purpose of the case studies analysis being performed 
in this work is to investigate the dynamics and the underlying reasons of the holding companies’ 
NAV evolution, trying to understand the impact of: 
-   business strategy, i.e. the market performance of the underlying listed assets;  
-   corporate strategy, i.e. the management “activism” in managing the asset portfolio; 
-   financial strategy, i.e. the company’s choices on the capital structure to be adopted, 
which impact the value creation process and the company risk profile. 
The analysis also aims to understand the related dynamics of the discount to NAV, to examine 
the Total Shareholder Return (TSR), i. e. the total return of a stock to an investor, and lastly to 
analyse the performance of holding companies compared to the market. 
The analysis has been conducted on a yearly basis for the period 2009-2017, in a post-crisis 
scenario. 
Different sources have been used in order to collect the data required for the analysis: 
-   For market capitalization and prices data, Bloomberg database has been used; 
-   For NAV estimation: 
•   Whenever available, NAV has been taken from the companies’ annual reports; 
•   When not available in the annual reports, NAV has been taken from analysts’ 
researches. In this case, it is important to take into consideration the fact that different 
analysts may use different valuation approaches and make diverse assumptions in 
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order to formulate a NAV estimation, which is therefore exposed to a certain level of 
subjectivity, especially related to the valuation of non-quoted stakes; 
•   In case it was not possible to adopt one of the first two options illustrated, NAV 
estimation is the result of personal calculations, through the application of the Sum-
of-the-Parts approach. In particular, stakes in quoted companies have been valued at 
their market prices every 31st of December, while stakes in unlisted companies have 
been considered at book value or at fair value if indicated in the holding’s annual 
reports. We obtain the NAV estimation by summing up the valuation of the listed and 
non-listed parts (Gross Asset Value) and then subtracting the net financial position of 
the holding company; 
-   The discount to NAV has been calculated through the application of the following 
formula:  
Discount / Premium =	  𝑀𝑘𝑡	  𝑐𝑎𝑝 − 𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑁𝐴𝑉 × 100 
-   For Total Shareholder Return data, Bloomberg function TRA (Total Return Analysis) 
has been used, obtaining the annualized return for the holding period, assuming 
dividends are reinvested at spot price. 
In making the comparison between the holding companies’ performance and the market, FTSE 
Italia All-Shares index has been taken as a reference as it includes all the elements constituting 
the indices FTSE MIB, FTSE Italia Mid Cap and FTSE Italia Small Cap. This choice is 
motivated by the fact that the holding companies presented in this work, because of their 
different characteristics in terms of market capitalization, free float and liquidity, are part of 
different indices. In particular: Exor is part of the FTSE MIB, the main benchmark index of the 
Italian stock market, which includes about the 80% of the internal market capitalization, 
Italmobiliare, CIR and Tamburi Investment Partners are part of the FTSE Italia Mid Cap, Immsi 





Exor is one of the Europe’s leading diversified holding companies. It was created in March 
2009 with the merger by incorporation in IFI of the subsidiary IFIL S.p.A., an operation aimed 
at shortening and simplifying the control chain of Fiat S.p.A. In December 2016, Exor S.p.A. 
merged with and into Exor Holding N.V., a Dutch wholly owned subsidiary of Exor S.p.A., 
which has been then renamed into Exor N.V.  
Exor N.V. is incorporated under the laws of the Netherlands and its ordinary shares are listed 
on MTA (Mercato Telematico Azionario managed and organized by Borsa Italiana S.p.A.). 
Exor N.V. is part of the FTSE MIB index. 
Exor is controlled by the Agnelli family through the company Giovanni Agnelli B.V., which 
holds 52.99% of its share capital (see fig. 3). Being a historical family company, with origins 
at the beginning of the XX century, several members of the Agnelli family directly participate 
in the management of the company and have a seat in the Board of Directors, as CEO and 
Chairman (John Philip Elkann) and as Non-Executive Directors (eight of the fourteen Non-
Executive Directors are instead qualified as independent under Dutch Corporate Governance 
Code).  
 









Giovanni Agnelli B.V. Harris Associates LP Southeastern AM, Inc. Other shareholders
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Current asset portfolio 
Exor is a holding company with investments in both publicly listed and unlisted companies. It 
does not have a specific business of reference, as the portfolio is characterized by diversification 
in terms of sector and geography, mainly in Europe and the United States. Exor is characterized 
by a strong separation between ownership and control, with voting rights in subsidiaries in 
excess of cash flow rights. As stated in the 2017 Annual Report, the investment portfolio is 
monitored and analysed constantly through the use of corporate governance rights (e.g. board 
representation) and through a constant dialogue with the management of the subsidiaries and 
affiliates, without exercising direction and coordination activities, thus without affecting their 
operating independence.  
Exor is an active shareholder, which combines an entrepreneurial approach with a prudent 
financial approach, and it operates applying an investment philosophy focused on long-term 
value creation.  
As of 31st December 2017, the main investments in Exor’s portfolio are the following: 
-   Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA) (29.18% stake and 42.34% of voting rights) is 
engaged in industrial activities in the automotive sector. Through companies located in 
forty countries, it engineers, manufactures, distributes and sells passenger cars, light 
commercial vehicles, components and production systems worldwide. It is listed on the 
NYSE and on the MTA managed by Borsa Italiana and it is included in the FTSE MIB 
Index; 
-   CNH Industrial (26.89% stake and 41.68% of voting rights) is engaged in industrial 
activities in agricultural equipment, construction equipment and commercial vehicles 
sectors. Thanks to the high variety of the products offered and its worldwide presence, 
it is a global leader in the capital goods segment. It is listed on the NYSE and on the 
MTA managed by Borsa Italiana and it is included in the FTSE MIB Index; 
-   PartnerRe (100% stake and 99.75% of voting rights) is a global leader in the reinsurance 
sector with headquarters in Bermuda. It provides Non-life (Property & Casualty and 
Specialty) and Life and Health reinsurance on a worldwide basis through its subsidiaries 
and branches; 
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-   Ferrari (22.91% stake and 32.75% of voting rights) is a global luxury sport cars brand, 
symbol of the “Made in Italy” excellence and exclusivity. It is listed on the NYSE and 
on the MTA managed by Borsa Italiana and it is included in the FTSE MIB Index; 
-   Juventus Football Club (63.77% stake, coincident with % of voting rights) is one of the 
most important and famous professional football teams in the world. It is listed on the 
MTA managed by Borsa Italiana; 
-   The Economist Group (43.40% stake and 20% of voting rights) is the editorial group 
that publishes The Economist weekly magazine, the leading source of analysis on 
international business, which sells more than one million copies worldwide.  
2.2.1 Performance analysis 
NAV evolution  
Since its inception in 2009 until 2016, under John Elkann management and leadership, Exor 
underwent a massive transformation, mainly aimed at globalizing and streamlining the portfolio 
and simplifying the holding structure and control chain. 
The “activism” in managing the asset portfolio has determined a decisive reshuffle over the 
years and this is immediately evident looking at the Gross Asset Value (GAV) evolution in the 
composition: 
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Making a comparison between the portfolio compositions at the beginning and at the end of the 
transformation period, first of all the diversification in GAV is immediately evident: while in 
2009 the portfolio was heavy concentrated on Fiat (61.30% of GAV), in 2017 it appears more 
balanced thanks to the entrance in the reinsurance business with PartnerRe (28.20% of GAV in 
2017 and 37.90% in 2016 immediately after the completion of the acquisition), thus reducing 
the dependence and the exposition to the automotive and industrial businesses. This portfolio 
reshuffle has also improved Exor’s geographic diversification, being revenues more 
international with North America representing about 50% in 2017, compared to 25% in 2009, 
when there was a strong dependence on the European market.  
 
Source: Personal re-elaboration of Company’s Annual Reports data 
Another important characteristic to consider is the GAV composition in terms of proportion 
between listed and unlisted assets. 
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Exor’s portfolio has always been composed of a significant share of listed assets, representing 
in 2009 about 85% of GAV. This high level of liquidity in the portfolio and the benefits possibly 
deriving from this on the market can be, however, considered partially tempered by the adoption 
of an investment policy aimed at retaining controlling stakes in the subsidiaries. In 2016, the 
acquisition of PartnerRe has weakened the portfolio liquidity and the market value of listed 
assets, which significantly diminished to about 55% of the investment portfolio. In 2017, the 
portion of listed assets increased again, representing about 70% of GAV, mainly triggered by 
the increase in Ferrari and FCA weights on GAV due to their strong market performance in that 
period. 
During the period 2009-2017, Exor’s NAV registered an almost fourfold increase with about a 
+16% CAGR. This successful path is due to a combination of the market performance of the 
underlying listed assets and the corporate actions undertaken to actively manage the asset 
portfolio.  
In analysing this dynamic, the presence of a potential impact deriving from the subjectivity and 
the different approaches used in the valuation of non-listed assets needs to be considered. In 
particular, as explained in Exor’s annual reports, the unlisted equity investments are valued at 




Source: Bloomberg, annual reports and personal re-elaboration. NAV taken from Company’s annual reports 
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We start now analysing NAV evolution, and the first significant event to be mentioned in Exor’s 
history is the first step of the transformation of FIAT Group in 2010, with the decision to 
separate Fiat Industrial S.p.A. from Fiat S.p.A. The aim of this operation was to guarantee a 
greater focus in the efforts on distinct sectors: automobiles for Fiat and capital goods (i.e. light 
and commercial vehicles, trucks, agriculture and construction equipment) for Fiat Industrial. In 
this way, being characterized by different business cycles, the business risk profile would have 
been reduced and also the market would have been able to better understand the potential of 
these companies, translating into a higher valuation of the two stand-alone companies.  
In 2011 we can observe a reduction of about 24% in NAV compared to the previous year. This 
negative performance can be attributed to external macroeconomic dynamics. Starting from 
2010, financial crisis turned into a sovereign-debt crisis, shifting the centre of attention from 
the private to the public sector. The sovereign crisis spread from Greece to other southern 
European countries, including Italy, determining a substantial increase in the interest rates on 
sovereign borrowing and raising doubts on the future of Europe’s monetary union. Despite the 
fact that about 60% of Exor’s revenues in this year comes from outside Europe, Agnelli’s 
holding is perceived as predominantly European and also, because of the nature of its 
investments, as highly exposed to economic cycles. All these elements are reflected in the bad 
market performance of Fiat S.p.A. in the second-half of the year and in the reduction of Exor 
NAV during the year. 
In 2012 Exor has performed several actions in order to simplify its business and corporate 
structure. First of all, it decided to reduce the number of smaller investments (e.g. divestment 
of Alpitour, BTG Pactual and Vision) in order to better focus on the larger ones, as it has been 
observed that the presence of smaller holdings in an investment portfolio may dilute the overall 
performance, and this because the management attention decreases when the amount of capital 
allocated is low, thus leading to overall underperformance (Exor Annual Report, 2012). The 
cash available from these proceeds has been mainly used for investment in The Black Ant fund 
and the acquisition of Arenella Immobiliare s.r.l. The second important action was the 
streamlining of Fiat and Fiat Industrial capital structures, by converting preferred and saving 
shares into a single class of ordinary stocks.  
2013 has been a key year for Exor, with NAV increased by 16.2% compared to the previous 
year. The main determinant of this increase has been the disposal of the entire investment (15% 
stake) in SGS S.A., world leading operator in verification, testing, control and certification 
 34 
activities. The operation has been performed as part of a strategy based on continuous portfolio 
evaluation and optimization. During Exor’s holding period (2000-2012), SGS focus has always 
been on operational improvement and revenues growth and its market capitalization increased 
approximately fourfold. The transaction generated net proceeds for 2 EURm and a capital gain 
of 1.5 EURm which, together with the amount of dividends received over the years, implied a 
fivefold cash-on-cash return on the initial investment. With the SGS disposal, we have a 
decrease in the value of the investments which is partially compensated by the Fiat market value 
increase during the year. At the same time, the sale is reflected in the increase in “Cash and 
cash equivalents” (+198% with respect to the previous year), reducing the company’s LTV6 to 
negative levels. The combination of these dynamics positively contributed to the NAV 
estimation.  
The intention to simplify the capital structure and governance of the Company is visible in the 
mandatory conversion of preferred and saving shares into ordinary shares in 2013. This 
operation allowed to guarantee a greater transparency to the external market and to eliminate 
classes of shares with very limited trading volumes. With the conversion into ordinary shares, 
also the latter have benefitted from greater liquidity.  
2014-2016 can be seen as the reinvestment phase in Exor’s history. These have been crucial 
years in Exor’s transformation, with corporate actions resulted in the realization of a more 
balanced portfolio, as it is today.  
The first transformation, promoted by Sergio Marchionne, is about Fiat with the acquisition of 
the remaining shares it did not already own in Chrysler, which enabled the creation in October 
2014 of FCA, with the merger of Fiat S.p.A. with and into Fiat Investments N.V., becoming the 
world’s seventh-largest auto manufacturer. In December 2014, Exor underwrote with an 
investment of about 700 EURm, its largest investment in the year, FCA mandatory convertible 
bonds (with conversion in 2016). With this deal, Exor preserved its ownership interest in FCA 
and benefitted from a 7.9% coupon per annum. In 2014, FCA also announced the spin-off of 
Ferrari which has been completed in January 2016. The acquisition of Chrysler during the crisis, 
the separation of Fiat from the agricultural and construction equipment assets conferred to Fiat 
Industrial then becoming CNH Industrial and the announcement of Ferrari’s spin-off are all a  
clear signal of a continuous evolution of the company beyond the organic growth. In 2016, Fiat 
                                               
6 Loan-to-Value (LTV) is the ratio between net debt at the holding company level (+ gross debt – cash and cash 
equivalents) and the appraised value of its investment portfolio (GAV). It is used by credit rating agencies to 
evaluate the financial risk profile of a company. 
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S.p.A. transformation can be considered completed: from an Italian conglomerate to three 
distinct strong global entities (FCA, CNHI and Ferrari). 
Another important event is, in 2015, the disposal of Cushman & Wakefield, a real-estate 
business present in Exor’s portfolio for about a decade. After having overcome 2008/2009 
financial crisis, which hit C&W very hard, thanks to a process of transformation into a global 
company - mainly through organic growth - Exor was able to sell its stake generating net cash 
proceeds of 1.1 EURbn and a capital gain of nearly 600 EURm on the initial investment.  
The amount of cash realized thanks to the exit from SGS in 2013 and C&W in 2015 has been 
then used to perform several investments, always focusing on the potential impact on NAV 
performance.  
The first decision has been the increase of the investment in The Economist Group from 5% to 
about 44%, becoming therefore its largest shareholder. Given the changes in the publishing 
industry, The Economist Group has been able to shift from advertisement-based revenue to paid 
circulation and from the print to the digital world, resulting to be a highly profitable business.  
PartnerRe 
Let’s focus now on the most important corporate action undertaken by Exor in the period: the 
acquisition of ParnerRe during 2015 and finalized in the first quarter of 2016. PartnerRe is a 
reinsurer company based in US, with a diversified geographical exposure and technical 
portfolio. Reinsurance companies play a critical role in the insurance industry value chain: 
primary insurers cede to reinsurers a share of their premiums, and associated liabilities, because 
they do not have sufficient capital or are concerned about earnings volatility and portfolio risk 
concentration. Reinsurers absorb the most volatile risks, i.e. the ones more unlikely to happen 
but with potentially considerable impacts (e.g. hurricanes); however, since they assume shares 
of exposures from a large number of primary insurers, they are able to sufficiently diversify the 
risk of their portfolio, both in terms of sector and geography.  
There is a number of reasons behind this operation: 
-   First of all, reinsurance sector has historically performed well, offering returns in excess 
of their cost of capital and higher than the MSCI World Index (considering the period 
1995-2015, the reinsurance sector has realized an annualized TSR of about 11% with 
respect to 6.5% delivered by the MSCI World Index – Source: Annual report 2015);  
-   Secondly, reinsurers usually generate strong cash flows, mostly distributed to 
shareholders in form of dividends or buybacks as it is not a high-capital intensive sector 
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so they require little capital expenditure in order to operate, differently from the 
industrial sector, which has always represented the major concentration of Exor’s 
investments; 
-   Thirdly, an investment in the financial services sector would allow a considerable 
diversification in portfolio, with PartnerRe representing about 38% of GAV in 2016, 
despite the weakening in the portfolio’s liquidity due to an increase in the portion of 
unlisted assets over GAV. The portfolio diversification is also in terms of FX, increasing 
the weight of the USD; 
-   Finally, within the reinsurance sector, the choice of PartnerRe has been determined by 
several elements: the fact that it was an industry leader, with a global presence and a 
diversified product offering; the fact that it had a solid capital structure, a conservative 
and prudent reserving strategy and the ability to historically outperform its industry 
peers; the fact that it would improve Exor’s portfolio credit quality since PartnerRe 
credit profile is widely in the investment-grade category (S&P ratings: A-/Stable in 
2016); the fact that it is exclusively focused on reinsurance business, avoiding to enter 
into competition with its own clients, unlike most of its competitors who were 
aggressively trying to grow in the primary insurance sector.   
In 2016, PartnerRe also introduced Real Estate as a new asset class in its investment portfolio, 
mainly with the acquisition from Exor of the participation in Almacantar. With this transaction, 
PartnerRe diversified its portfolio and Exor used the entire proceeds to reduce its debt. 
Ferrari 
The last important corporate action that needs to be mentioned is the completion of the spin-off 
of Ferrari from FCA and its listing on MTA in January 2016 (listing in the NYSE in October 
2015). With this operation, Exor has become direct shareholder of Ferrari (in 2016: 22.91% 
stake of issued capital and 32.75% of voting rights).  
Ferrari positioning in the car industry is very peculiar. During the years, the brand has become 
a symbol of excellence, quality, performance, exclusivity and “Made in Italy”. In order to fully 
exploit the value of the brand, Ferrari also started a diversification strategy outside the core 
business of cars and into other luxury market categories with licensed products. Ferrari cannot 
be considered solely as a car manufacturer because it can rely on a very loyal customer base 
(most of the cars are sold to existing Ferrari owners and about 30% of the clients are owners of 
more than one Ferrari), because of its high price point and related low sold volumes and because 
of its high brand recognition, also thanks to the presence in Formula 1 racing championship. As 
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a result, buying Ferrari cannot be seen as buying a car but rather a status symbol and, for this 
reason, Ferrari has to be considered as a luxury company rather than a carmaker. It thus appears 
evident that Ferrari’s business model is completely different from FCA’s one, as FCA is 
focused on the cars mass market. The operation of spin-off has been of strategic importance 
since it allowed Ferrari to obtain visibility in the market, unlocking its value stuck within FCA’s 
mass-market status, and gave Exor a direct exposure to a luxury brand asset.  
Looking at the NAV evolution, we can observe a sharp increase of about 50% from the 
beginning of 2014 until 2016. This outstanding performance is connected to the described 
corporate actions, which allowed to diversify and rebalance the portfolio and to streamline the 
company capital structure. This activism in portfolio reshuffle has also been visible in the 
market performance of the underlying assets. In 2015, FCA market performance (+34.4% in 
share price YoY), reflecting its outstanding operating performance and the market expectations 
about Ferrari spin-off, has significantly contributed to Exor NAV performance. In 2016, CNHI 
market performance (+25.5% in share price YoY) and Ferrari market performance (+23.5% in 
share price YoY) positively contributed to Exor NAV performance. 
In 2017 we can observe a further increase in NAV. The main contributions come from Exor’s 
industrial assets, which came again representing about  65% of GAV. In particular, FCA market 
performance (during the year it almost doubled its market cap) and Ferrari market performance 
(+60% in share price YoY) have been the main determinants of Exor outstanding NAV 
performance (+38% YoY). A less positive contribution has come from PartnerRe, which had 
to face a challenging environment, determined by the high frequency and severity of 
catastrophic events in the Americas during the year.  
Summing up, during the considered period, Exor’s NAV registered a significant increase 
(+16% CAGR). After having analysed the NAV evolution over the years, the successful path 
can be considered to be mainly triggered by the corporate strategy that has been implemented. 
Minor asset disposals aimed to streamline the portfolio and concentrate on larger investments, 
acquisition and spin-off operations aimed to balance, globalize and diversify the portfolio 
exposition and corporate actions aimed to simplify the holding structure and the control chain 
allowed Exor to realize a remarkable reshuffle of its portfolio, which has directly been traduced 
in a significant value creation. This active and dynamic approach in portfolio management has 
also positively impacted the market performance of the underlying assets, thus further 
increasing Exor’s NAV.  
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Exor performance vs. market 
 
Source: Bloomberg, annual reports and personal re-elaboration. 
If we look at the Exor’s NAV evolution, during the period 2009-2017, NAV increased by 
222.10%, exceptionally outperforming the FTSE Italia All-Shares Index, which increased by 
just 2.28% in the same period.  
Taking into consideration Exor’s global profile as investment holding, FTSE Italia All-Shares 
Index could be considered not the most suitable benchmark. The company has indeed 
deliberately chosen to benchmark itself against the global MSCI World Index, which captures 
large and mid-cap representation across 23 Developed Market countries, with the explicit target 
of outpacing it. During the period 2009-2017, Exor NAV/Share has shown a 22.1% CAGR, 
outperforming its benchmark by 9.7 p.p. 
 










2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
EXOR NAV vs FTSE Italia All-Shares





The corporate actions undertaken during the years, in the context of an active portfolio 
management, are directly related to the financial strategy and structure of the company.  
In the analysis of the financial structure policy, the Net Financial Position of the Holding 
System – i.e. Exor N.V. and the subsidiaries which carry out activities regarding equity 
investments and financial market investments – has been taken into consideration, as reported 
in the company annual reports, since it is considered the best representation of the financial 
resources and commitments directly attributable to and managed by Exor. 
 
Source: annual reports. NFP calculated as Cash and cash equivalents – Gross financial debt. 
Exor’s history has been always characterized by a conservative capital structure and a relatively 
prudent management approach regarding the investment policy, with a limited tolerance for 
debt both at holding level and subsidiaries, reflected in a loan-to-value ratio always well placed 
below the 20% threshold (except in March 2016, immediately after PartnerRe acquisition, when 
LTV was about 28% and in December 2016 when LTV was almost at its limit of 20%). In 2013 
we can observe a substantial increase in Cash and cash equivalents thanks to the proceeds from 
SGS disposal, which reduced company’s LTV to negative levels. In 2015 Gross financial debt 
increased in view of PartnerRe and The Economist acquisitions but it was more than offset by 
the cash in resulted from C&W disposal, the placement of Exor treasury stock and FCA 
mandatory convertible bond. The acquisition of PartnerRe in the first half of 2016 has 
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one. In addition to debt, Exor used all the cash (keeping just some cash equivalents) to finalize 
this operation in March 2016.  
Starting from this date, Exor began a gradual deleveraging process, with a reduction of about 
30% only in 2016. This debt reduction has been achieved through a combination of: 
-   Disposals of some non-core assets in the portfolio. The most important transactions 
were the divestment of Almacantar (sold to PartnerRe) in 2016 and the redemption of 
the Black Ant fund in the first quarter of 2017. In addition to these major operations, 
Exor also cleaned its portfolio with other small divestments (e.g. Benijay, RCS 
MediaGroup, Arenella Immobiliare and other investment funds); 
-   Dividends received, amount which substantially increased in 2016 compared to the 
previous year thanks to PartnerRe and Ferrari; 
-   Minimization of the investments. The only investment the company has realized in the 
period, on top of PartnerRe, was WellTec, a world leader in the field of robotics 











Discount to NAV 
After having investigated, in the previous section, the NAV evolution and the related main 
determinants, we continue with the analysis by considering how the market has changed its 
valuation about Exor during the reference period. Thus, by comparing in each year the market 
capitalization to the NAV, we can study the discount to NAV dynamic and try to understand its 
key factors.  
 
Source: personal calculation 
Exor is characterized by the persistence of a discount between its Market Value and NAV.  
Starting from a very high level of discount to NAV (about 45%) in 2009, we can observe a 
substantial squeeze in 2013, when the discount reached 29%. This change can be mainly 
attributed to the mandatory conversion of Exor’s preferred and saving shares into ordinary 
shares. This operation allowed to eliminate classes of shares with very limited trading volumes 
and to increase the liquidity of ordinary shares. Moreover, the conversion contributed to 
simplify the company’s capital structure. The reduction in the discount to NAV applied by the 
market (Exor’s stock price increased by about 50% in 2013 compared to the previous year) can 
be thus attributed to the increase in the liquidity of the shares and to the minority shareholders’ 
perception of a greater transparency from the company. 
In 2014 and 2015, Exor’s discount to NAV reached its lowest levels and this can be attributed 
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corporate actions undertaken, the company has been able to rebalance its asset portfolio with 
the investment in PartnerRe and to simplify it with several disposals of minor investments, 
reducing in this way its excessive diversification. The result was a portfolio reshuffle, 
characterized by a concentration on a very selected number of large and value creating 
investments. This active management of portfolio companies has been rewarded by the market 
with a re-rating of Exor and a reduction in the discount to NAV, which reached the level of 
20% in 2015. 
In 2016 and 2017, Exor’s discount to NAV widened, reverting to its historical mean. One 
possible explanation can be the reduced liquidity of the portfolio because of an increase in the 
portion of unlisted assets after PartnerRe acquisition. In the 2017 Letter to shareholders, Exor 
CEO focuses on the discount to NAV attributed by the market. He said that, as for Exor’s peers, 
the discount is usually motivated by the perceived lower transparency of the holding structure 
and the risk of expropriation from the controlling family. He pointed out that, on the other hand, 
family-owned businesses have an enduring strength deriving from the prudence and sense of 
responsibility in managing the portfolio and strong values.  
In 2017 Exor has a discount to NAV of 37%, mainly driven by the fact that the strong re-rating 
of FCA (+73% YoY) and Ferrari (+60% YoY), which together constitutes almost the 50% of 
total GAV, has not been reflected in Exor’s stock price, which increase by only 25% over the 
same period. Because of this level of discount, the CEO has pointed out that buying Exor means 
buying its listed assets and getting PartnerRe for free. He also said he believed that the constant 
effort put in the improvement of the value of the assets Exor owns will be reflected in the market 







Total Shareholder Return 
Total Shareholder Return can be analysed in connection with the performance of the underlying 
assets (listed and not listed) in the holding company’s portfolio and the discount to NAV 
dynamic over the years.  
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Over the period 2009-2017, Exor delivered an annualized TSR of 19.6%, compared to 3.7% 
returned for the FTSE Italia All-Shares Index.  
Assuming an investment value of 100 in 2009, Exor has delivered exceptionally positive returns 
to its shareholders over the years, as the initial investment value more than fourfold during the 
period 2009-2017. In particular, Exor delivered an annualized TSR of 85.7% in the first year 
(period 2009-2010), then started to stabilize to around 20% if we consider an investment 
holding period of four to eight years (from 2009-2013 to 2009-2017). 
This considerably good performance by Exor can be mainly associated with the performance 
of its underlying assets. For the purpose of this analysis, referring to the period during which 
the assets are part of the portfolio, only the listed assets have been taken into consideration, 
although, however, the unlisted assets also exert an influence on the return being delivered. In 
particular, Exor’s TSR delivered in the period 2009-2017 has been predominantly triggered by 
FCA (TSR equal to 48% in the period 2014-2017) and Ferrari (TSR equal to 68.7% from its 
listing in January 2016 until 2017 year-end), which altogether represent almost half of the total 
Exor’s investment portfolio value in 2017.  
In analysing the TSR, we also consider the dynamic of the discount to NAV, which is 
persistently applied by the market to Exor. During the analysed period, we can observe a 
squeeze of the discount to NAV, which from a level of 44% in 2009 decreased to 37% in 2017. 
This dynamic is connected with the active portfolio management approach adopted all over the 
period, which therefore indicates that the value creation process triggered by the adopted 
corporate strategy, constantly focused on portfolio optimization and holding structure 
simplification, has also been recognised by the market. However, this reduction in the discount 
to NAV has a positive incidence of roughly only 1% on the TSR equal to 19.6% delivered by 
Exor in the period 2009-2017. 
Combining all these elements together, it can be derived that Exor, despite the persistent 
discount to NAV, has delivered a considerably high return to its shareholders, mainly thanks to 
the significant good performance of the listed assets in its portfolio, producing almost five times 
the return of the FTSE Italia All-Shares Index. 
This positive performance of Exor as an holding company can be also linked to a study 
presented in the Exor’s 2017 annual report about the performance of a worldwide sample of 
diversified holding companies7, which actively allocate capital and are proactive owners of their 
                                               
7 For the analysis have been selected 14 Diversified Holdings with a market cap in excess of $10 billion in the 
Americas, EMEA and APAC countries.  
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businesses. As it can be inferred from the data presented, over the period 1997-2017, the 
selected diversified holdings have been a good investment since they outperformed the business 
they own8 by about 50% and produced almost five times the return of the MSCI World Index 
denominated in Dollars. 
 






                                               
8 Analysing the investment portfolio of these holdings, the business they own considered meet the following 
criteria: 1) a market cap in excess of $0.5 billion; 2) the holding owns at least 5% of the business’ economic capital; 
3) they have been in the holding’s portfolio for at least the last 10 years. 67 businesses met these criteria.  
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2.3 ITALMOBILIARE 
Italmobiliare is one of the Italian leading holding companies, which holds and manages a 
diversified investment portfolio with a strategic vision supported by a financial and industrial 
history of more than 150 years. It was founded in 1946 by Italcementi S.p.A. with the aim of 
managing the investments in areas other than construction materials. In 1979, through a reverse 
merger, Italmobiliare become the holding for the entire group. 
Starting from 1980, Italmobiliare shares are listed on MTA (Mercato Telematico Azionario 
managed and organized by Borsa Italiana S.p.A.). Italmobiliare is part of the FTSE MIB index. 
Italmobiliare is controlled by the Pesenti family through the company Epifarind B.V., which 
holds 44.00% of its share capital (see fig. 4). Being a historical family company, with origins 
at the end of the 19th century (when Italcementi was established), several members of the Pesenti 
family directly participate in the management of the company and have a seat in the Board of 
Directors, as CEO (Carlo Pesenti) and as Non-Executive Directors (seven of the thirteen Non-
Executive Directors are instead qualified as independent under Italian Corporate Governance 
Code). 
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Current asset portfolio 
Italmobiliare is a holding company with a portfolio of investments in diversified sectors, in both 
publicly listed and unlisted companies. Italmobiliare is a quite active shareholder, whose 
strategy for managing the portfolio is to hold a limited number of “core” investments, over 
which a strategic and financial control is exercised, in diversified sectors, with a strong boost 
in terms of internationalization and a limited use of financial leverage. The portfolio can be 
considered to be divided in: investments in portfolio companies, i.e. a close number of 
controlled or related companies, with Italmobiliare representatives on their governance bodies; 
investments in private equity funds, with the aim of taking up opportunities in geographical 
areas or business sectors where Italmobiliare is not directly involved; minority investments in 
diversified sectors with interesting growth prospects or steady investment returns. The portfolio 
has a medium-to-long-term investment horizon, with a focus on value creation. 
As of 31st December 2017, the main investments in Italmobiliare’s portfolio are the following: 
-   Sirap Gema (100% stake) is active in the production and sale of products for the 
packaging of fresh food. It is characterized by an international presence and it is one of 
the leading player in Europe, with plants and distribution centres in fifteen countries; 
-   Italgen (100% stake) produces and distributes electricity from renewable resources on 
national and international markets, with hydroelectric power plants in Northern Italy 
and wind farms in Bulgaria, Turkey and Morocco; 
-   Tecnica Group (40% stake) is a sportswear manufacturer in the market of outdoor 
footwear and winter sports equipment, with a brand portfolio including some of the 
industry’s historic names; 
-   Clessidra SGR (100% stake) is the leading manager of Private Equity funds exclusively 
dedicated to the Italian market through the funds Clessidra Capital Partners (CCP), 
Clessidra Capital Partners II (CCPII) and Clessidra Capital Partners III (CCPIII), in 
which Italmobiliare is anchor investor; 
-   HeidelbergCement (2.4% stake) is one of the world’s largest building materials 
companies. The core activities include the production and distribution of cement and 
aggregates and it operates with production sites in sixty countries worldwide. It is listed 
on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. 
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2.3.1 Performance analysis 
NAV evolution  
Considering the period 2009-2017, Italmobiliare has always been focused on value creation by 
leveraging its financial solidity and its determination to pursue new investments with a long-
term outlook. Especially in the last two years, Italmobiliare underwent an important 
transformation, mainly aimed at diversifying the portfolio and simplifying the holding structure. 
The “activism” in managing the asset portfolio has determined a considerable reshuffle over 
the last few years and this is immediately evident by looking at the Gross Asset Value (GAV) 
evolution in the composition: 
          
Source: Personal re-elaboration of Company’s Annual Report data (2009 and 2017) 
Making a comparison between the portfolio compositions at the beginning and at the end of the 
period considered in this analysis, the diversification in GAV is immediately evident: while in 
2009 the portfolio was heavy concentrated on the construction materials sector with Italcementi 
group (53.99% of GAV – 47.6% of NAV), in 2017 it appears to be more balanced thanks to the 
expansion of new operations in the private equity segment starting from 2016 (9.55% of GAV) 
and the increased investments in portfolio companies, i.e. Sirap Gema, Italgen, Tecnica Group 
and Clessidra SGR, belonging to diversified sectors (24.07% of GAV). In this way, the 
dependence and exposition to the construction business has been reduced, accounting in 2017 
for about 44% of GAV (28% of NAV) with the investment in HeidelbergCement, which is part 
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Another important characteristic to consider is the GAV composition in terms of proportion 
between listed and unlisted assets. 
 
Source: Personal re-elaboration of Company’s Annual Reports data 
Italmobiliare’s portfolio has always been composed of a significant share of listed assets, 
representing in 2009 about 70% of GAV and reaching the level of about 90% of GAV in 2015 
due to the increase in Italcementi weight on GAV, triggered by its strong market performance 
in that period. In 2016, the sale of Italcementi has weakened the portfolio liquidity and the 
market value of listed assets, which significantly diminished to about 56% of the investment 
portfolio and it remained stable in 2017. 
During the period 2009-2017, Italmobiliare’s NAV registered a decrease with about a -4% 
CAGR.  
In analysing this dynamic, the presence of a potential impact deriving from the subjectivity and 
the different approaches used in the valuation of non-listed assets needs to be considered. In 
particular, as explained in Italmobiliare’s annual reports, the non-listed companies are valued, 
when determinable, based on market multiples or on specific experts’ valuations; when such 
information is not available, non-listed companies are valued based on the book value of equity, 
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Source: Bloomberg, annual reports and personal re-elaboration. NAV taken from Company’s annual reports. 
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We start now analysing NAV evolution. Italmobiliare has been characterized until 2015 by an 
almost unchanging investment strategy, without a particularly active portfolio management 
approach. The portfolio has always been concentrated in the cement and construction materials 
sector with the core investment being Italcementi, in addition to the relevant exposure to the 
financial sector with stakes in major Italian banks (e.g. Mediobanca, Unicredit and UBI) and 
miscellaneous interests in the media sector and non-listed assets. This portfolio configuration 
was determined in 2010 with Italmobiliare’s acquisition - from the subsidiary Italcementi - of 
the equity investments in RCS MediaGroup and Mediobanca. This transaction aimed to 
simplify and rationalize the Group structure, by enabling Italcementi to focus only on its core 
business and by optimizing the management of equity investments, thus ensuring a more 
effective and flexible approach, thanks to the direct control by Italmobiliare. This operation was 
part of a reorganization project of Italmobiliare’s activities in the financial sector, which was 
performed during the period 2010-2012. The project aimed at shortening the control chain of 
the investments with a consequent reduction in the management costs, simplification and 
greater efficiency in the group structure. 
During the period 2009-2012 we can observe a continuous reduction of NAV, which has halved 
during these years. This negative performance can be attributed to external macroeconomic 
dynamics. The uncertainty in the credit market and the sovereign-debt crisis in southern 
European countries had a strong impact on the stock market, especially on the securities of the 
financial sector, to which Italmobiliare was significantly exposed. The negative market 
performance of the investments in the banking sector (in the period: UBI share price almost        
-60%, Unicredit share price almost -70% and Mediobanca share price almost -40%) was thus 
directly reflected in the NAV reduction. Furthermore, this negative momentum in the 
international economic scenario had also a strong impact on the cement business, which 
represented almost 50% of total investment portfolio value. The crisis in the real estate sector 
was reflected in a weak cement demand in key countries, such as western-central Europe and 
US, plus Egypt because of its complex political transition in 2011, which was only partially 
compensated by the positive trend in some emergent countries, especially in Asia. Moreover, 
the concomitant increase in the energy prices, which represent a relevant portion of the variable 
production cost in this sector, needs to be considered. This critical scenario was directly 
reflected in Italcementi bad market performance (share price almost -55% during the period), 
thus even more negatively impacting on Italmobiliare’s NAV. 
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In 2013, the mitigation of tensions on sovereign debt in the euro area and the signs of recovery 
in the world economic activity were reflected in the stock prices of most sectors and countries. 
The positive market performance of Italmobiliare’s investments in the financial sector and, 
above all, the strong re-rating of Italcementi (+47% YoY), which represented almost 65% of 
GAV, triggered the increase in Italmobiliare’s NAV of about 19% compared to the previous 
year. 
2015 has been a key year for Italmobiliare, with NAV increased by almost 80% compared to 
the previous year. During the year, the Italmobiliare Group began an extensive review of its 
scope of operations and its portfolio management strategy, resulting in a more active approach. 
This led to an agreement in July with the HeidelbergCement group for the sale of the equity 
investment in Italcementi, to be finalized in mid-2016. The agreement led to the creation of a 
leading global player in building materials sector, characterized by an undergoing consolidation 
phase worldwide. The agreement contemplated the purchase by HeidelbergCement of 
Italmobiliare’s stake (45%) in Italcementi and the allotment of HeidelbergCement shares to 
Italmobiliare, representing a 5.3% stake in the German group, through a reserved share capital 
increase. Accordingly, Italmobiliare would become the second industrial shareholder of 
HeidelbergCement with a representative in the Supervisory Board. As part of the same 
agreement, Italmobiliare has committed to acquire certain non-core assets of Italcementi, which 
include Italgen (renewable energy sector), BravoSolution (e-procurement) and certain real 
estate properties. This operation allowed Italmobiliare to secure the financial resources for 
further development of its investment portfolio and represented for both Italcementi and 
HeidelbergCement the best option in terms of future growth and value creation, thanks to their 
complementary profile and synergies exploitation. The market positive expectations about this 
transaction were reflected in the outstanding Italcementi share performance in 2015 (+107% in 
share price YoY), which significantly contributed to Italmobiliare’s NAV increase over the 
year. 
In 2016, the refocusing and re-organization plan launched in 2015 continued. First of all, the 
sale of Italcementi to HeidelbergCement has been completed in July. Secondly, Italmobiliare 
approved the distribution of an extraordinary preferred dividend to the saving shareholders 
only, partially in cash and partially in kind with HeidelbergCement ordinary shares, and the 
simultaneous conversion of the saving shares into ordinary shares. This operation allowed to 
streamline the Group capital structure and to guarantee a greater transparency to the external 
market. Thirdly, Italmobiliare realized a diversification in its investment portfolio with new 
 53 
investments in the Private Equity sector, which at the end of 2016 represented about 8% of 
GAV. The first investment has been in January in a US private equity fund issued by BDT 
Capital Partners. The aim of this operation was to diversify Italmobiliare’s NAV also on a 
geographical basis through direct participation in co-investments in the US and in Europe and 
also to enable Group companies already active in the US to access the network of contacts for 
potential business development in diversified sectors. The second operation has been the 
acquisition of Clessidra SGR, the main private equity fund manager exclusively dedicated to 
the Italian market. In 2016, Italmobiliare’s NAV decreased by almost 20% compared to the 
previous year, largely due to the change in the Group structure, in particular the distribution of 
a special preferred dividend exclusively to saving shareholders. If, however, we consider the 
proforma situation at the end of 2015, including the effect of the sale of Italcementi and the 
transactions relating to the conversion of the saving shares, NAV increased by about 6% during 
2016, thanks to Italmobiliare’s activism in managing its portfolio. 
2017 saw a series of active management initiatives in the investment portfolio, which were 
aimed at creating value with a long-term outlook. The first initiative was the execution of 
Italmobiliare ordinary stocks’ split, at a rate of two new Italmobiliare ordinary shares for each 
ordinary share. This operation aimed at facilitating the circulation of the shares, boosting the 
trading volumes among the investors and generating a potential increase in share liquidity. 
Secondly, Italmobiliare continued the diversification process of its asset portfolio. For this 
purpose, it decided to become a shareholder of TecnicaGroup (40% stake), a firm operating in 
outdoor footwear and ski equipment. Moreover, Italmobiliare divested its interest in 
BravoSolution with the simultaneous acquisition of a 9.5% shareholding in Jaggaer, the world 
leader in eProcurement, which has taken over control of BravoSolution. This diversification 
process was also sustained by the expansion of operations in the private equity segment. In 
2017, Italmobiliare’s NAV decreased by about 3% compared to the previous year. If, however, 
we consider the proforma situation at the end of 2016, including the effect of the 100 million 
euro buy-back operation performed in mid-2017, NAV increased by almost 3% during 2017, 
thus proving Italmobiliare’s ability to increase the value of its investment portfolio thanks to 
the adoption of an active approach. The positive evolution of NAV during 2017 has also been 
triggered by the good market performance of Italmobiliare’s listed assets (e.g. Mediobanca 
share price almost +27% YoY).  
Summing up, during the analysed period, Italmobiliare’s NAV registered a decrease (-4% 
CAGR). However, if we take into consideration the years 2014-2017 as a reference period, 
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Italmobiliare’s NAV has registered an increase of about +10% CAGR. This successful 
evolution can be considered to be mainly triggered by the active portfolio management 
approach adopted mainly starting from 2015. In fact, the sale of Italcementi to 
HeidelbergCement and the concomitant acquisition of a stake in HeidelbergCement share 
capital, the corporate actions aimed to simplify the capital structure and to give greater liquidity 
and dynamism to the shares on the stock market, the diversification of the portfolio through 
disposals, acquisitions and, finally, the entrance in the private equity business allowed 
Italmobiliare to perform a reshuffle and refocusing of its portfolio, which has been visible in a 
significant value creation over the last years.  
Italmobiliare performance vs. market 
 
Source: Bloomberg, annual reports and personal re-elaboration. 
If we look at the Italmobiliare’s NAV evolution, during the period 2009-2017, NAV decreased 
by 27.76%, underperforming the FTSE Italia All-Shares Index, which increased by 2.28% in 
the same period. However, if we take into consideration, as reference period, the years 2014-
2017, Italmobiliare’s NAV registered an increase of about 35%, outperforming the FTSE Italia 
All-Shares Index by almost 15 p.p.. This successful evolution over the last years can be 
considered to be mainly triggered by the change in the corporate strategy adopted mainly from 
2015, and this confirms the fact that the application of an active portfolio management approach 
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The corporate actions undertaken during the years are directly related to the financial strategy 
and structure of the company.  
In the analysis of the financial structure policy, the Net Financial Position of the Holding 
System – i.e. Italmobiliare S.p.A. and the subsidiaries in the financial and private equity 
segment (e.g. Franco Tosi S.r.l. and Clessidra SGR S.p.A. in 2017) – has been taken into 
consideration, as reported in the company annual reports. 
 
Source: annual reports. NFP calculated as Cash and cash equivalents – Gross financial debt. 
Italmobiliare’s history has been always characterized by a strongly conservative capital 
structure and a prudent management approach regarding the investment policy, with limited use 
of leverage and a significant amount of cash reserves, reflected in a loan-to-value ratio always 
at negative levels calculated with reference to the Holding System. The available liquidity has 
been used during the years for the investment plans performed by the company. In 2016 we can 
observe a substantial increase in liquidity compared to the previous years, mainly due to the 
sale of Italcementi. Thanks to these resources, Italmobiliare has been able to start its 
transformation process, which consisted of the following: the acquisition of BravoSolution and 
Italgen from Italcementi, the investment in private equity funds, the payment of the 
extraordinary dividend to the saving shareholders with the contextual conversion of the saving 
shares into ordinary shares, the financing of the buy-back operation, the sale of BravoSolution 
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Italmobiliare can still count on a significant amount of cash reserves, which can be used to 
further sustain its development plans with an on-going consideration of new possible 
investments oriented to a long-term value creation. 
Discount to NAV 
After having investigated, in the previous section, the NAV evolution and the related main 
determinants, we continue with the analysis by considering how the market has changed its 
valuation about Italmobiliare during the reference period. Thus, by comparing in each year the 
market capitalization to the NAV, we can study the discount to NAV dynamic and try to 
understand its key factors.  
 
Source: personal calculation 
Italmobiliare is characterized by the persistence of a discount between its Market Value and 
NAV.  
Starting from a very high level of discount to NAV (about 46%) in 2009, we can observe a 
further increase until 2012, reaching the level of 55%. This dynamic can be mainly attributed 
to the difficult macroeconomic context in those years, which strongly impacted on the 
performance of the underlying assets and thus also on Italmobiliare market performance itself 
(Italmobiliare share price registered an almost -60% during the period 2009-2012). In 2013, the 
signs of recovery in the world economic activity triggered a strong re-rating of Italmobiliare’s 
assets, in particular of Italcementi (+47% YoY) which represented almost 65% of GAV. This 
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(market cap almost doubled compared to the previous year), then reflected in a halving of the 
discount to NAV applied by the market to Italmobiliare’s shares (from 55% in 2012 to 27% in 
2013).  
In 2015 we can observe a further squeeze in the discount to NAV, which reached the level of 
21%. This can be mainly related to the exceptional market performance of Italcementi during 
the year (+107% in share price YoY), because of the positive market expectations about its sale 
to HeidelbergCement announced in mid-2015. The announcement of this operation, which can 
be considered the starting point for the transformation process in Italmobiliare’s asset portfolio, 
has been rewarded by the market with a strong re-rating of Italmobiliare (market cap more than 
doubled between 2014 and 2015) and a reduction in the applied discount to NAV. 
In 2016 and 2017, Italmobiliare’s discount to NAV widened from the extraordinary low level 
reached in 2015, reverting to its historical mean. However, the active portfolio management 
approach adopted and the operations on the capital structure performed during these years are 
fundamental in order to be rewarded by the market with a reduction in the applied discount to 
NAV. In particular, the saving share conversion into ordinary shares performed in 2016 allowed 
to increase the liquidity of the shares, simplify the company’s capital structure and thus enhance 
the minority shareholders’ perception of a greater transparency from the company. Moreover, 
the execution of ordinary stocks’ split in 2017 allowed to facilitate the circulation of the shares, 
boosting the trading volumes among the investors and generating a potential increase in share 
liquidity. As a result, this increased liquidity - combined with the activism in managing the 
assets through disposals and acquisitions aimed to balance and diversify the portfolio looking 
at a long-term value creation - will potentially be reflected in an Italmobiliare re-rating as well 







Total Shareholder Return 
Total Shareholder Return can be analysed in connection with the performance of the underlying 
assets (listed and not listed) in the holding company’s portfolio and the discount to NAV 
dynamic over the years.  
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Over the period 2009-2017, Italmobiliare delivered an annualized TSR of 6.9%, compared to 
3.7% returned for the FTSE Italia All-Shares Index.  
Assuming an investment value of 100 in 2009, Italmobiliare has delivered negative returns to 
its shareholders until 2014, as the initial investment value decreased and almost halved in 2011 
and 2012. Starting from 2015, the investment value recovered the losses of the previous years 
and Italmobiliare started to deliver positive returns to its shareholders, stabilized to around 6%-
7% if we consider an investment holding period of six to eight years (from 2009-2015 to 2009-
2017).  
The considerably negative performance by Italmobiliare until 2014 can be mainly associated 
with the bad performance of its underlying assets, largely belonging to the financial and banking 
sector and to the real estate business, which particularly suffered the difficult macroeconomic 
dynamics of those years. Italmobiliare’s shares amplified the effects of this negative market 
momentum and delivered a considerably lower TSR compared to the one delivered by the FTSE 
Italia All-Shares Index. 
In 2015, Italmobiliare registered an inversion of trend: the investment value increased by almost 
50% compared to the initial one, recovering all the accumulated losses, and shareholders 
realized a return of about 6.5% considering the period 2009-2015. This amount of TSR 
delivered can be totally attributed to the reduction in the discount to NAV registered during the 
same reference period, triggered by the adoption of a more active approach in portfolio 
management. This activism, focused on capital structure simplification and portfolio 
optimization and diversification, continued to be applied also in 2016 and 2017. This change in 
corporate strategy has been positively valued by the market and directly traduced in a positive 
return for Italmobiliare’s shareholders, equal to 6.9% considering the whole 2009-2017 period, 
of which roughly 2% can be attributed to the reduction in the discount to NAV applied by the 
market. Considering also the performance of the underlying assets, a positive contribution to 
Italmobiliare’s 2009-2017 TSR has come from Italcementi (annualized TSR equal to 5.0% from 
2009 until its sale in October 2016 - positive only from mid-2015), which has always 
represented almost half of the total value of the portfolio, HeidelbergCement (annualized TSR 
equal to 6.8% since its entrance in Italmobiliare’s portfolio in October 2016, after Italcementi 
sale, until 2017) and Mediobanca (annualized TSR equal to 7.8% in the period 2010-2017). For 
the purpose of this analysis, referring to the period during which the assets are part of the 
portfolio, only the listed assets have been taken into consideration, although, however, the 
unlisted assets, e.g. the investments in private equity funds performed starting from 2016, also 
have exerted an influence on the return being delivered. 
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Combining all these elements together, it can be derived that Italmobiliare’s positive annualized 
TSR delivered in the period 2009-2017 has been determined by the change in the approach used 
for managing the investments in its portfolio. Becoming a proactive owner of its business, the 
underlying assets in the portfolio registered a positive performance and the market rewarded 
this change reducing the applied discount to NAV. This allowed to produce almost two times 




CIR is one of the Italian leading holding companies, that holds and manages a balanced 
portfolio of assets, with strong positions in their respective businesses, adopting a long-term 
investment strategy, with focus on controlling stakes.  
It was founded in 1976 when Carlo De Benedetti acquired control of the tanning company CIR 
and transformed it into a holding company. CIR shares are listed on MTA (Mercato Telematico 
Azionario managed and organized by Borsa Italiana S.p.A.) since 1973. CIR is part of the FTSE 
Italia Mid Cap index.  
CIR is controlled by the De Benedetti family through the company COFIDE-Gruppo De 
Benedetti, a listed company with the mere role of parent company and with no relevant 
additional portfolio diversification, which holds 45.80% of its share capital (see fig. 5). Being 
a historical family company, several members of the De Benedetti family directly participate in 
the management of the company and have a seat in the Board of Directors, as Chairman 
(Rodolfo De Benedetti) and as Non-Executive Directors (six of the nine Non-Executive 
Directors are instead qualified as independent under Italian Corporate Governance Code). 
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Current asset portfolio 
CIR is a holding company with a portfolio of investments in diversified sectors, in both publicly 
listed and unlisted companies. CIR investment strategy stands out for the balanced nature of its 
long-term oriented investment portfolio in companies with a leading position in their respective 
businesses. The portfolio is currently focused on three major businesses (healthcare, media and 
automotive components), in addition to non-core investments in Private equity sector and NPLs. 
CIR plays an active role in governance and in strategic decision making of portfolio companies, 
with a constant focus on growth opportunities and non-core investments rationalization and 
with a limited use of financial leverage.  
As of 31st December 2017, the main investments in CIR’s portfolio are the following: 
-   Gedi Gruppo Editoriale (45.7% stake) is an Italian media group, with presence in 
dailies, periodicals, radio, internet and advertising. It is the Italian leading publisher of 
newspapers and online news, as well as the number two private player in the radio 
sector. It is born in 2017 with the merger of ITEDI group (publisher of newspapers) into 
the Espresso group, historical asset of CIR’s portfolio. It is listed on the MTA managed 
by Borsa Italiana; 
-   Sogefi (56.7% stake) is a global leader in the automotive components sector, specialized 
in suspensions, filtration, air and cooling. It has a global presence in 23 countries with 
41 production facilities. It is listed on the MTA managed by Borsa Italiana; 
-   KOS (59.5% stake), founded in 2002 by CIR, is one of the main Italian operators in 
private healthcare sector, operating in hospital management, long-term care and 
diagnostics and oncology treatments. Starting from 2012, it is developing its presence 
also in UK and in India; 
-   Non-core investments: portfolio of miscellaneous non-core investments, especially in 
private equity sector and NPLs portfolio. 
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2.4.1 Performance analysis 
NAV evolution  
Considering the period 2009-2017, CIR has always been focused on value creation by 
leveraging its strong holding system financial structure and its balanced portfolio of assets, 
characterized by attention to a limited number of selected businesses, over which CIR plays an 
active role in governance and in strategic decision making.  
   
Source: Personal re-elaboration of analysts’ reports data (2009 and 2017) 
Making a comparison between the portfolio compositions at the beginning and at the end of the 
period considered in this analysis, we can observe a persistent focus on selected businesses. 
However, over these years, the weight of each sector on the GAV has profoundly changed: 
while in 2009 the portfolio was heavily concentrated on the energy sector with Sorgenia 
(42.38% of GAV), in 2017 it is no longer exposed to the power generation market, being 
concentrated instead on the healthcare sector with KOS (49.30% of GAV) and on car 
components sector with Sogefi (27.29% of GAV). In this way, CIR has been able to reduce its 
dependence on cyclical businesses, giving more weight to the healthcare sector, favoured by 
demographic trends and characterized by very low cyclical exposure.  
An important weakness of CIR’s portfolio that needs to be considered is the limited 
geographical diversification, being strongly dependent on the Italian market. However, over the 
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representing about 43% in 2017, compared to about 83% in 2009. This geographic 
diversification has been favoured by the sale of Sorgenia, which was operative only on the 
domestic market, and the increasing contribution coming from Sogefi, characterized by an 
international worldwide presence. 
 
Source: Personal re-elaboration of Company’s Annual Reports data 
Another important characteristic to consider is the GAV composition in terms of proportion 
between listed and unlisted assets. 
 
Source: Personal re-elaboration of analysts’ reports data 
CIR’s portfolio has always been composed of a significant share of unlisted assets (always more 
than half of GAV), represented by the historical stakes in Sorgenia and in KOS. The only 
exception in this composition is in 2013, due to the strong market performance of the listed 
assets in the portfolio (L’Espresso and Sogefi) and the concomitant bad performance of 
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During the period 2009-2017, CIR’s NAV registered a decrease with about a -6% CAGR.  
In analysing this dynamic, the presence of a potential impact deriving from the subjectivity and 
the different approaches used in the valuation of non-listed assets needs to be considered. In 
particular, in the analysts’ reports used in this analysis, the non-listed companies are valued, 
when determinable, based on specific experts’ valuations (market multiples or DCF method); 
when this is not possible, non-listed companies are valued based on the book value of equity, 













Source: Bloomberg, annual reports and personal re-elaboration. NAV taken from analysts’ reports. 
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We start now analysing NAV evolution. CIR has been characterized, until 2015, by an almost 
unchanged investment strategy, without a particularly active portfolio management approach. 
Over the period 2009-2015, the portfolio has always been concentrated in the energy sector 
with the core investment being Sorgenia, in addition to the relevant exposure to the media sector 
(stake in L’Espresso), the car components sector (stake in Sogefi), the healthcare sector (stake 
in KOS) and miscellaneous interests in education, private equity, venture capital and NPLs.  
During the period 2010-2014 we can observe a reduction of NAV and this negative performance 
can be mostly attributed to external macroeconomic dynamics and financial market turmoil. 
The strong European economic recession of these years has strongly hit in particular L’Espresso 
and Sorgenia, which suffered from both cyclical and structural issues.  
The media sector, in which CIR operated with L’Espresso, has been characterized in those years 
by a crisis in advertising revenues and a decline in the circulation of newspapers, not sufficiently 
compensated by the growing initiatives undertaken in the digital field. These cyclical and 
structural challenges had an adverse impact on L’Espresso operations, and this directly traduced 
in a bad market performance (share price about -38% over the whole period), thus negatively 
contributing to CIR’s NAV. 
In addition, over these years, Sorgenia has been characterized by a very negative profitability 
scenario. This has been mainly triggered by the overcapacity in the Italian power generation 
market, caused by weak demand and the huge increase of renewables, which has caused trouble 
in the Italian thermoelectric generation market. For the other utilities, this impact has been 
mitigated by their business diversification, while for Sorgenia’s power plants the overcapacity 
hit its main source of operating performance. Given this drastic change in market scenario, 
Sorgenia faced the impossibility to comply with the repayment plans for debts assumed in the 
previous years for the building of four new CCGTs. In 2013, Sorgenia thus decided to activate 
a debt restructuring plan and, as a consequence, CIR decided to write-off the entire interest in 
Sorgenia. This has been reflected in a cut to zero of Sorgenia’s contribution to CIR’s NAV, 
after having being for years the main asset in the portfolio. This negative contribution to CIR’s 
NAV has been partially offset in 2013 by the strong market performance of CIR’s underlying 
listed assets (L’Espresso share price +54.5% YoY and Sogefi share price +140.1% YoY). 
In 2015, we can observe a slight increase in NAV (+5.6% YoY). This can be linked to the 
positive market performance of the listed assets (L’Espresso share price +6.2% YoY and Sogefi 
share price +4.8% YoY) and to the completed exit from Sorgenia, with the transfer of the entire 
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interest to the lending banks. Given Sorgenia’s bad performance over the previous year, the 
divestment can be considered a starting point for future value creation. In 2015, CIR also 
decided to sale its interest in SEG (Swiss Education Group), a world leader in hospitality 
management training, in which CIR invested in 2011. This divestment aimed to focus the 
management attention on the three main businesses in the portfolio (healthcare, car components 
and media), rationalizing the non-core investments. 
In 2016-2017, CIR’s NAV continued to increase (+9.8% YoY in 2016 and +5.0% YoY in 
2017). This dynamic can be explained, first of all, by the positive contribution coming from 
KOS, the company operating in the private healthcare sector, in which CIR has also increased 
its stake in 2016 (KOS represented almost 50% of GAV in 2017). Thanks to this operation, in 
the last two years, the asset portfolio has become more balanced and less exposed to cyclical 
sectors and this has been reflected in an increase in its value. The growing dynamic in NAV 
over these years has also been sustained by the considerably positive market performance of 
Sogefi (share price almost +85% in the last two years). 
Summing up, during the analysed period, CIR’s NAV registered a decrease (-6% CAGR). 
However, if we take into consideration the years 2014-2017 as a reference period, CIR’s NAV 
has registered an increase by about +7% CAGR. This positive evolution can be considered to 
be mainly triggered by management activism started in 2015, observable in the completion of 
the exit from the historical asset Sorgenia, which was a cause of value destruction during the 
recent years because of cyclical and structural challenges in the energy production sector, in the 
rationalization of the non-core investments as well as in the focus on selected businesses, 
reflected in the decision to increase the investment in the healthcare sector, which is anticyclical 






CIR performance vs. market 
 
Source: Bloomberg, analysts’ reports and personal re-elaboration. 
If we look at the CIR’s NAV evolution, during the period 2009-2017, NAV decreased by 
39.47%, underperforming the FTSE Italia All-Shares Index, which increased by 2.28% in the 
same period. However, if we take into consideration, as reference period, the years 2014-2017, 
CIR’s NAV increased by about 22%, outperforming the FTSE Italia All-Shares Index by almost 
2 p.p.. This positive evolution and value creation over the last years can be considered to be 
mainly triggered by the increased management activism adopted, which has been expressed in 
the exit from the energy production sector and the decision of concentrating the portfolio on 
specific assets with leading positions in their respective businesses through a progressive 
disposal of non-core investments.  
Financial structure 
The corporate actions undertaken during the years are directly related to the financial strategy 
and structure of the company.  
In the analysis of the financial structure policy, the Net Financial Position of the Holding 
System – i.e. CIR S.p.A. and the non-industrial subsidiaries (e.g. CIR Investimenti S.p.A. and 
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Source: annual reports. NFP calculated as Cash and cash equivalents – Gross financial debt. 
CIR’s history has been always characterized by a strongly conservative capital structure and a 
prudent management approach regarding the investment policy, with limited use of leverage 
and a significant amount of cash reserves, reflected in a loan-to-value ratio always at negative 
levels calculated with reference to the Holding System. In 2013, we can observe a substantial 
increase in liquidity compared to the previous years, due to the final ruling by the Supreme 
Court in the “Lodo Mondadori” case definetly condamning Fininvest to pay a net compensation 
in favour of CIR of 491.3 €million. In 2015, CIR registered a cash-in from the sale of its stake 
in SEG and these resources have been used in the next year for the increse of the stake in KOS. 
This is the expression of CIR’s strategy of focus on selected assets with leading positions in 
their businesses, through progressive monetisation of the non-core investments in the portfolio. 
Discount to NAV 
After having investigated, in the previous section, the NAV evolution and the related main 
determinants, we continue with the analysis by considering how the market has changed its 
valuation about CIR during the reference period. Thus, by comparing in each year the market 
capitalization to the NAV, we can study the discount to NAV dynamic and try to understand its 
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Source: personal calculation 
CIR is characterized by the persistence of a discount between its Market Value and NAV.  
During the period 2009-2012, we can observe high volatility in the discount to NAV applied 
by the market. Starting from a level of 35% in 2009, the discount to NAV reached levels of 
more than 50% in 2010 and 2012. This dynamic can be mainly attributed to the difficult 
macroeconomic context in those years, which strongly impacted on the performance of the 
underlying assets, especially Sorgenia and L’Espresso, and thus also on CIR market 
performance itself (CIR share price registered almost -56% during the period 2009-2012). An 
exception is represented by the considerably low discount in 2011. This can be maybe explained 
by the fact the market did not fully incorporated in CIR’s share price the reduction of Sorgenia’s 
value and of the listed assets into CIR’s NAV: in 2011, indeed, CIR’s NAV reduced by about 
42% compared to the previous year, while CIR’s share price only decreased by almost 10% 
YoY.  
In 2013, the signs of recovery in the world economic activity triggered a strong re-rating of 
CIR’s listed assets, with L’Espresso registering a +54.5% YoY and Sogefi a +140.1% YoY. 
This positive dynamic has been directly traduced in a strong CIR’s market performance (market 
cap registered almost +45% compared to the previous year), then reflected in a substantial 
squeeze of the discount to NAV applied by the market to CIR’s shares (from 54% in 2012 to 
30% in 2013).  
Starting from 2014 until 2017, CIR’s discount to NAV widened from the low level reached in 
2013, reverting to its historical mean. However, the actions undertaken in recent years to focus 
the portfolio only on selected businesses, combined with the positive market performance of 
Sogefi, will potentially lead to a progressive recognition by the market of CIR’s ability to create 
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Total Shareholder Return 
Total Shareholder Return can be analysed in connection with the performance of the underlying 
assets (listed and not listed) in the holding company’s portfolio and the discount to NAV 
dynamic over the years.  
 
Source: Bloomberg (TSR) and personal re-elaboration 
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Over the period 2009-2017, CIR delivered an annualized TSR of -4.0%, compared to 3.7% 
returned for the FTSE Italia All-Shares Index.  
Assuming an investment value of 100 in 2009, CIR has delivered negative returns to its 
shareholders during the period of analysis, as the initial investment value decreased and almost 
halved in 2012 and 2014, after a partial recover in 2013. This considerably negative 
performance by CIR can be mainly associated with the bad performance of its underlying assets, 
which particularly suffered cyclical and structural challenges during those years. In particular, 
L’Espresso, become GEDI in 2017 after the merger with ITEDI, delivered an annualized return 
of -12.4% during the period 2009-2017. Moreover, it needs to be mentioned that, for the 
purpose of this analysis, only the listed assets have been taken into consideration, although, 
however, the unlisted asset Sorgenia has surely also exerted a strong influence on the negative 
return being delivered. 
However, it needs to be noticed that, starting from 2015, CIR shareholders have seen a 
progressive increase in the value of their initial investment, even if the accumulated losses 
reported from 2009 have not yet been covered. If we considered, as reference period, the years 
2014-2017 and an investment value of 100 in 2014, we could find out that CIR has delivered a 
positive annualized TSR of 13%. This means that the exit from Sorgenia in 2015 and the 
management decision to create a balanced portfolio with focus only on selected businesses, 
with an increasing interest in the healthcare sector (KOS – non-listed asset) and through a 
progressive monetisation of the non-core assets in the portfolio, have created value for CIR’s 
shareholders. Therefore, we can consider the actions undertaken in recent years, combined with 
the positive performance of Sogefi - which delivered an annualized TSR of 10.6% in the period 
2009-2017 - as the main determinants in order to deliver a positive return to the shareholders. 
The positive performance of the assets in the portfolio may also traduce in a reward from the 
market with a reduction of the applied discount to NAV.  
In explaining the annualized TSR equal to -4.0% delivered in the period 2009-2017, the most 
important influence comes from the performance of the underlying listed and not listed assets 






Immsi is an Italian holding company, which manages a portfolio of over forty companies, 
operating in diversified sectors. 
It was founded in 2000 with the spin-off of the real estate branch of Sirti S.p.A., part of the 
Telecom Italia Group. Immsi shares are listed on MTA (Mercato Telematico Azionario 
managed and organized by Borsa Italiana S.p.A.) since 2000. Immsi is part of the FTSE Italia 
Small Cap Index.  
Immsi is controlled by the Colaninno family, through the wholly owned company 
Omniaholding S.p.A. and its subsidiary Omniainvest S.p.A., which together count for 59.83% 
of Immsi share capital (see fig. 6). Being a family company, several members of the Colaninno 
family directly participate in the management of the company and have a seat in the Board of 
Directors, as Chairman (Roberto Colaninno), CEO (Michele Colaninno) and as Non-Executive 
Directors (four of the seven Non-Executive Directors are instead qualified as independent under 
Italian Corporate Governance Code), as well as important governance positions in the 
subsidiaries. 
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Current asset portfolio 
Immsi is a holding company with a portfolio of investments in diversified sectors, in both 
publicly listed and unlisted companies. Immsi investment strategy is focused on long-term 
value creation for the shareholders, also by re-launching companies with important growth 
prospects, with the aim of strengthening the market positions in their respective business 
sectors. The portfolio is currently focused on three major businesses (real estate, industrial and 
naval), in addition to non-core investments (e.g. in Alitalia and Unicredit).  
As of 31st December 2017, the main investments in Immsi’s portfolio are the following: 
-   Piaggio Group (50.1% stake) is Europe’s largest scooter and motorcycle manufacturer 
and one of the world leaders in its sector. Today, it operates in two-wheelers, light 
commercial vehicles and robotic sectors, with industrial sites in Italy, India and Vietnam 
and with a brand portfolio including some of the industry’s most famous names; 
-   Real estate sector – tourist and holiday resort – through the companies Pietra (77.8% 
stake), Apuliae (85.7% stake) and Is Molas (67.3% stake, owned through 72.6% stake 
in ISM Investimenti). The most significant investment in the sector is the Is Molas 
luxury resort complex in Sardinia, with a project involving the expansion of hotel 
services and the construction of new buildings;  
-   Naval sector through Intermarine (72.5% stake, owned through 72.5% stake in RCN 
Finanziaria), a shipyard specialized in designing and building ships in steel, aluminium 
and composites, for both civil and defence applications. It is a worldwide leader in 





2.5.1 Performance analysis 
NAV evolution  
Considering the period 2009-2017, Immsi has always been focused on investments in a limited 
number of businesses, in diversified sectors. 
       
Source: Personal re-elaboration of analysts’ report data (2009) and personal calculations (2017) 
Making a comparison between the portfolio compositions at the beginning and at the end of the 
period considered in this analysis, we can observe a persistent focus on the same selected 
businesses, characterized by high cyclical exposure. The portfolio has always been heavily 
concentrated on Piaggio group, represented as “Industrial sector” (68.42% of GAV in 2009 – 
78.00% of GAV in 2017). Moreover, an important portion of the portfolio has always been 
represented by the investments in the real estate sector (17.21% of GAV in 2009 – 19.71% of 
GAV in 2017). The investments in the naval sector (1.46% of GAV in 2017) were also in place 
in 2009 but, considering the analysts’ report data as reference, they have been valued at zero, 
given the continuous not profitability over the years and the need of a restructuring process. 
The weight of the non-core investments, represented as “Others”, has diminished over the 
period, mainly due to the reduction of the investment in Unicredit and the full write-down of 
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Another important characteristic to consider is the GAV composition in terms of proportion 
between listed and unlisted assets. Immsi’s portfolio has always been composed of a significant 
share of listed assets (always more than 60% of GAV), almost exclusively represented by the 
stake in the Piaggio Group.  
 
Source: Personal re-elaboration of analysts’ reports data 
During the period 2009-2017, Immsi’s NAV registered a decrease with roughly a -3% CAGR.  
In analysing this dynamic, the presence of a potential impact deriving from the subjectivity and 
the different approaches used in the valuation of non-listed assets needs to be considered. In 
particular, in the analysts’ reports and in the personal calculations used in this analysis, the non-
listed companies are valued, when determinable or available in the company’s annual reports, 
based on specific experts’ valuations (e.g. through multiples or DCF method); when this is not 
possible, non-listed companies are valued based on the book value of equity, as reported in the 






2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
GAV breakdown - listed and not listed assets
Listed assets Unlisted assets
 78 
 
Source: Bloomberg, NAV 2009-2012 from analysts’ reports, NAV 2013-2017 from personal calculations. 
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We start now analysing NAV evolution. Immsi has been characterized by an almost unchanged 
investment strategy, without a particularly active portfolio management approach. The portfolio 
has always been concentrated in the industrial sector, with the core investment being Piaggio 
group, in addition to the relevant exposure to the real estate sector, the naval sector and 
miscellaneous non-core interests, such in Unicredit and Alitalia. 
During the period 2010-2012 we can observe a reduction of NAV, which was halved during 
the period, and this negative performance can be mostly attributed to external macroeconomic 
dynamics and financial market turmoil that have strongly impacted all the businesses in which 
Immsi operated.  
Starting from the industrial sector, which always represented almost 70% of the total value of 
Immsi’s portfolio, Piaggio operated in a particularly complex market context and competitive 
scenario, at least in Europe and in the US. In spite of this, Piaggio has been able to maintain a 
leadership position. The decreasing performance realized over these years in these markets, 
however, has been partially compensated by the strong performance realized in the Asian 
region, with both the two-wheelers and the light commercial vehicles businesses.  
Considering the naval sector, in which Immsi operated through Rodriquez group (controlled 
through RCN Finanziaria), it constantly reported losses, due to insufficient marginality to 
absorb the direct costs of production and those of fixed structures. This unprofitability is 
connected to the underestimation of some production costs, delays in progress on the orders 
and lack of new significant sales contracts in the yacht business, because of the economic 
recession. In order to face this critical situation, the companies belonging to the Rodriquez 
group undertook, over these years, an extensive restructuring process, to be finalized in 2014, 
in order to simplify and streamline the corporate chain and pursue operating synergies, thus 
reducing the overhead management costs. The merger by incorporation of Rodriquez Cantieri 
Navali into the 100% controlled company Intermarine performed in 2012 represented an 
important step in this restructuring process.  
The negative momentum in the European economic scenario has also strongly impacted the 
real estate sector, to which Immsi was exposed through investments in tourist and holiday 
resorts. 
In 2013, Immsi registered an increase in the value of its portfolio, followed by a decreasing 
trend until 2016. It should to be noted that the NAV dynamic over these years has been almost 
exclusively determined by the market performance of Piaggio, the main asset in terms of value 
in the portfolio, constantly combined with the negative performance in the naval and real estate 
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sector, as well as the ongoing reduction of the value of the investments in Unicredit and Alitalia 
(full write-down of the investment in 2017).  
In 2017 Immsi’s NAV increased by about 30% compared to the previous year. This increase in 
value can be mainly attributed the extremely good performance in the market by Piaggio (share 
price +49.60% YoY). However, the improved performance of Intermarine also played a role. 
In fact, Intermarine returned to being profitable in 2017, after having focused from 2014 mainly 
on the defence sector, less exposed to difficult macroeconomic conditions compared to the 
ferries and yacht business. 
Summing up, analysing the NAV evolution during the period 2009-2017, it can be derived that 
the dynamics can be almost entirely attributed to two factors: external macroeconomic events 
and the market performance of the underlying listed asset Piaggio, which during these years has 
been able to maintain and strengthened its worldwide leading position by exploiting the 
opportunities in the emerging Asian markets. In fact, Immsi did not particularly demonstrate its 
activism in managing the portfolio, through strategic value creating acquisition or divestment 
operations. 
IMMSI performance vs. market 
 
Source: Bloomberg, analysts’ reports and personal re-elaboration. 
If we look at Immsi’s NAV evolution, during the period 2009-2017 NAV decreased by 22.04%, 
underperforming the FTSE Italia All-Shares Index, which increased by 2.28% in the same 
period. Only in the last year, thanks to Piaggio’s good market performance and the restored 
profitability in the naval sector, Immsi’s NAV registered an increase of 30%, outperforming 
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 In the analysis of the financial structure policy, the Net Financial Position of the Holding 
Company - i.e. Immsi S.p.A. - has been taken into consideration, as reported in the company 
annual reports. 
 
Source: annual reports. NFP calculated as Cash and cash equivalents – Gross financial debt. 
During the period 2009-2017, Immsi has been characterized by a leveraged capital structure, 
resulting in an average loan-to-value ratio of 12%. The level of leverage in 2009 can be mainly 
connected to the conclusion of the acquisition of the remaining share of the undersigned 
investment in Alitalia. The reduction of leverage in 2010 can be mainly attributed to the sale of 
Piaggio shares, which has been performed again in 2013 and 2015. The adoption of a leveraged 
financial structure is also linked to the participation in 2013 to Alitalia’s capital increase 
operation and to other disbursements in favour of Alitalia in 2014-2015-2016, in compliance 
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Discount to NAV 
After having investigated, in the previous section, the NAV evolution and the related main 
determinants, we continue with the analysis by considering how the market has changed its 
valuation about Immsi during the reference period. Thus, by comparing in each year the market 
capitalization to the NAV, we can study the discount to NAV dynamic and try to understand its 
key factors.  
 
 
Source: personal calculation 
Immsi is characterized by the persistence of a high level of discount between its Market Value 
and NAV. This dynamic can be attributed to the company’s portfolio composition. Given the 
low visibility of the unlisted assets in the portfolio, the market seems to be only assigning value 
to and recognizing the stake in Piaggio.  
In 2017 we can observe a reduction of about 26 p.p. in the discount to NAV compared to the 
previous year (64% in 2016 vs. 47% in 2017). This movement may be linked to the good market 
performance of Piaggio (share price +49.60% YoY) and to the fact that the naval sector, with 
the unlisted asset Intermarine, has reverted to being profitable after years of continuous losses 
and a restructuring process. This positive performance of the underlying assets has been valued 
by the market and reflected in a re-rating of Immsi’s shares (market cap almost doubled YoY), 













2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
IMMSI - Discount to NAV (year-end)
Discount to NAV Avg discount to NAV
 83 
Total Shareholder Return 
Total Shareholder Return can be analysed in connection with the performance of the underlying 
assets (listed and not listed) in the holding company’s portfolio and the discount to NAV 
dynamic over the years.  
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Over the period 2009-2017, Immsi delivered an annualized TSR of -0.0%, compared to 3.7% 
returned for the FTSE Italia All-Shares Index.  
Assuming an investment value of 100 in 2009, Immsi has delivered negative returns to its 
shareholders during the period 2009-2016, as the initial investment value decreased. It needs to 
be mentioned that, for the purpose of this analysis, only the listed assets have been taken into 
consideration, although the unlisted assets in naval and real estate business surely have exerted 
a strong influence on the negative return being delivered, given their suffering of cyclicality 
challenges and their constantly being in loss during the reference period. The negative 
performance of the unlisted assets has been only partially compensated by the listed asset 
Piaggio, the most important one in terms of weight on total portfolio value, which has instead 
delivered an annualized TSR of 4.6% during the 2009-2017 period. In 2017, Immsi has reported 
an outstanding performance, almost recovering all the accumulated losses of the previous years, 
which could have been triggered by the naval sector good performance, turned to be profitable, 
along with the extremely good market performance of Piaggio.   
In explaining the annualized TSR equal to -0.0% delivered in the period 2009-2017, it can be 
concluded that the positive contribution of roughly 1% coming from the discount to NAV 
dynamic observed during the same years and the positive performance of Piaggio have been 







2.6 TAMBURI INVESTMENT PARTNERS 
Tamburi Investment Partners (TIP) is an independent Italian investment and merchant bank 
focused on medium-sized Italian companies, which undertakes investment activities as an 
active shareholder through minority stakes and advisory activities in corporate finance 
operations through the division Tamburi & Associati.  
It was founded in 2000 by Giovanni Tamburi and Alessandra Gritti and the shares are listed on 
MTA (Mercato Telematico Azionario managed and organized by Borsa Italiana S.p.A.) since 
2005. TIP is part of the FTSE Italia Mid Cap Index.  
It is owned by several prominent Italian entrepreneurs and family-owned firms, representing a 
precious and unique network of competencies for the company’s operations (see fig.7). 
 
Fig.7 – Ownership structure. Source: Company’s annual report (2017) 
Current asset portfolio 
TIP is an independent investment bank, mainly investing through minority stakes in both 
publicly listed and unlisted medium-sized Italian companies, featuring forefront positions in 
their respective markets and with good growth potential. TIP acquires minority interests with 
the aim of helping companies in exploiting new opportunities, thus accompanying 
entrepreneurs and the management in the process of growth and value creation. The companies 
in which TIP invests are selected based on the management quality and reliability, the existence 
of distinctive commercial and industrial features which make a company an “excellence” and 
the actual possibility of playing an active shareholder role. TIP invests under two different 






d'Amico Società di Navigazione S.p.A. Angelini Partecipazioni Finanziarie s.r.l. Giovanni Tamburi Other shareholders
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other entrepreneurs/investors – leaving operating management to the entrepreneurs, with whom 
it sometimes makes governance agreements, and without setting a fixed time horizon and 
considering a priori way-out operations, as the decisions are always based on the potential of 
the assets and on delivering added value through its role of minority shareholder. TIP owns a 
diversified portfolio of assets, which is managed by adopting an extremely flexible and dynamic 
approach, with the company always ready to exploit value and grasp the best opportunities 
offered by the market. 
Over time, TIP adopted a more structured approach to its investments. Now, it has four vehicles 
through which it carries out investments, characterized by distinct investment criteria: 
-   TIPO (TIP pre-IPO) is a specific vehicle which targets smaller companies (sales 
ranging from 30 €m to 200 €m) in the development phase, aiming to be listed; 
-   Asset Italia, founded in 2016, is specialized in carrying out structured club deals, with 
each shareholder having the faculty to choose, every time a proposal arises, whether to 
participate or not to each individual investment; 
-   StarTIP, founded in 2017, is specialized in investments in the start-up, digital and 
innovation fields; 
-   TIP, which directly focuses on other investments. 
As of 31st December 2017, TIP’s portfolio is composed as follows: 
 
Source: Company’s presentation (12.03.2018) 
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The main listed assets, in terms of value over total GAV, are the following: 
-   Interpump (23.67% stake, owned through 33.7% stake in Gruppo IPG Holding) operates 
in the mechanical components industry, specifically in the water jetting sector and in 
the hydraulic sector, in which it has a worldwide leading position; 
-   Moncler (1.77% stake) is a world leader in the luxury winter clothing segment; 
-   Amplifon (2.67% stake) is the world leader in the distribution and custom application of 
hearing aids. 
The main unlisted assets, in terms of value over total GAV, are the following: 
-   Azimut Benetti (12.07% stake) is the leading Italian group in the yachting industry and 
one of the world’s leading private luxury boating groups; 
-   Alpitour (30.9% stake, owned through Asset Italia) is a leading Italian online and offline 
tour operator, also active in providing all the services for tourists arriving in a country; 
-   Eataly (19.7% stake, owned through 30.20% stake in Clubitaly) is a high-end Italian 









2.6.1 Performance analysis 
NAV evolution  
Since its inception in 2000, TIP distinguished from the other Italian listed investment companies 
for its greater flexibility and dynamic portfolio management, resulting in a very fast portfolio 
rotation, with an estimated weighted average holding period of 4-5 years. TIP’s main objective 
is to create value for shareholders by buying minority stakes and helping companies to develop 
their business and exploit new opportunities. This acquisition strategy is accompanied by an 
equally important and focused divestment strategy of assets.  
TIP manages a highly diversified portfolio of assets, typically concentrated in luxury/fashion, 
technology/innovation and healthcare sectors. Considering the period 2009-2017 and the 
realized acquisition/divestment operations, Gross Asset Value (GAV) has registered an 
evolution in the composition. 
          
Source: Personal re-elaboration of analysts’ reports data (2009 and 2017) 
Making a comparison between the portfolio compositions at the beginning and at the end of the 
reference period, the greater exposure to the luxury/design/retail sector (11.19% of GAV in 
2009 – 40.10% of GAV in 2017) appears immediately evident. This is connected with the 
acquisitions performed over the entire period in this sector (e.g. Moncler, Ferrari, Hugo Boss, 
Azimut Benetti, Roche Bobois). Also the healthcare and tourism sectors have increased their 
weight in terms of GAV (7.38% in 2009 – 15.59% in 2017), after Amplifon and Alpitour have 
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characterised the portfolio management over the analysed period, in 2017 resulted in a more 
balanced portfolio in terms of sectors exposure. 
Another important characteristic to consider is the GAV composition in terms of proportion 
between listed and unlisted assets. TIP’s portfolio has always been composed of a significant 
share of listed assets – always representing more than 60% of GAV and slightly varying over 
the years depending on the companies targeted for acquisition deals – thus granting a high level 
of liquidity to the portfolio.  
  
Source: Personal re-elaboration of analysts’ reports data 
During the period 2009-2017, TIP’s NAV registered an almost fivefold increase with about 
+23% CAGR. This extremely successful path is due to a combination of market performance 
of the underlying listed assets and the numerous corporate actions undertaken to actively 
manage the asset portfolio.  
In analysing this dynamic, the presence of a potential impact deriving from the subjectivity and 
the different approaches used in the valuation of non-listed assets needs to be considered. In 
particular, in the analysts’ reports used in this analysis, the non-listed companies are valued, 
when determinable, based on specific experts’ valuations (market multiples method); when this 
is not possible, non-listed companies are valued based on the book value of equity, as reported 
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Source: Bloomberg, annual reports and personal re-elaboration. NAV taken from analysts’ reports. 
  





31/12/09 31/12/10 31/12/11 31/12/12 31/12/13 31/12/14 31/12/15 31/12/16 31/12/17
TIP NAV and Market Performance of main underlying listed assets
 NAV Amplifon Ferrari FCA
BE Think Solve Execute Hugo Boss Interpump Moncler



















2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
TIP NAV (EURm, year-end) and main corporate actions
Investments in Moncler 
(Ruffini PartecipazionI) 
and Roche Bobois 
  
Disposal of Printemps  
Investments in 





Hugo Boss and 

























We start now analysing NAV evolution. During the considered period, TIP’s NAV registered 
a continuous increase from year to year and, unlike the other analysed holding companies, did 
not particularly suffered the external negative macroeconomic dynamics and the financial 
market turmoil. 
In 2010, NAV increased by 21.6% compared to the previous year and this is linked to the 
significant investments performed during the year, for a total amount of over 70 €m. TIP 
invested in Prysmian (world leader in the production of cables for energy and 
telecommunications), through Clubtre vehicle, Amplifon and Borletti Group Finance, which 
owns a 30% stake of Printemps (second most important chain of department store in France). 
These operations were perfectly consistent with TIP’s investment philosophy, as particularly 
Prysmian and Amplifon are both market leaders in their respective sectors and were investing 
aggressively to take new growth opportunities. Along with the introduction of these strategic 
assets in the portfolio, a positive contribution to the NAV increase over the year was also given 
by the very positive market performance of the main underlying listed assets (e.g. Interpump 
+54% YoY, Datalogic +49% YoY, Bolzoni +59% YoY, Noemalife +15% YoY), which 
reflected their robust operating progresses and very sound balance sheets. 
2012 has been a year of portfolio rationalization, characterised by new investments in some 
core positions (including Amplifon, Interpump and Be) as well as by divestitures of some 
smaller holdings (De Longhi, Del Clima, Diasorin, IMA, NH Hoteles and Zignago Vetro), 
realizing a capital gain of roughly 3 €m. As explained in the company’s 2012 annual report, 
TIP has decided to exit these companies, albeit excellent at both industrial and financial levels, 
because they did not represent particularly relevant investments and also because they were part 
of groups in which it was not easy to completely fulfil the function of active shareholder, thus 
not strategically consistent with TIP’s investment philosophy. The combination of these 
operations, in addition to the positive market performance of the underlying listed assets (first 
among all Prysmian, which registered +60% share price YoY, representing 25% of GAV), 
positively contributed to the NAV dynamic, with an increase of 7.7% compared to the previous 
year.  
Also 2013 has been characterized by significant investment and divestment activity, resulting 
in a strong value creation, being NAV increased by 43.9% compared to the previous year. In 
April, TIP announced the acquisition of a 20% stake in Roche Bobois, the world’s leader 
distributor of luxury furniture, with a club deal through the vehicle TXR (51% controlled by 
TIP). This deal, which involved a non-listed and international group, strengthened TIP’s 
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position in the luxury sector and in the international stage, confirming its focus on market 
leaders engaged in global expansion. In July, TIP announced that an agreement was reached for 
the disposal of Printemps entire investment, generating a cash-in of about of around 42 €m and 
a capital gain of approximately 33 €m, thus demonstrating TIP’s ability in identifying and 
enhancing the value of the investments in non-listed and foreign assets. This deal also allowed 
to generate fresh financial resources for reinvestment opportunities, as confirmed by the 
subsequent acquisition, with a club deal through the vehicle Clubsette (52.5% controlled by 
TIP), of a 14% stake in Ruffini Partecipazioni, a holding that owned 32% of Moncler, world 
leader in the luxury winter clothing segment. Through all these operations realized over the 
year, TIP confirmed its ability to identify new investment opportunities and to build an investee 
portfolio well balanced between listed and not-listed, Italian and foreign assets, with an 
attractive exposure also to luxury/design/fashion sector. The remarkable NAV increase over the 
year, in addition to the mentioned corporate actions, has been positively influenced by the 
extremely good market performance of all the main listed underlying assets. 
2014 continued to be marked by various significant deals, in terms of both investments and 
divestments, as well as developing new strategic initiatives. The first important deal has been 
the acquisition in March, with a club deal through the vehicle Clubitaly (27.5% controlled by 
TIP), of a 20% stake in Eataly, a high-end Italian food market chain that distributes, on a global 
scale, products of Italian food and wine excellence. The deal perfectly fitted TIP’s investment 
strategy, i.e. the cream of “Made in Italy” companies managed by top business people, with a 
clear worldwide growth project. The purpose of the investment was to float Eataly on the stock 
exchange within few years in order to make it a global public company, able to represent Italian 
lifestyle with even greater strength and with an increasingly international profile, thanks to the 
financial benefits and visibility of the listing. Other important investments during the year have 
been the one in FCA performed in August (0.15% stake), as well as the increase in stakes in 
Interpump, Roche Bobois and Moncler, proving the support that TIP provides to subsidiary 
companies with solid growth potential. During the year, TIP also proceeded with the 
monetization of its historical investment in Datalogic, realizing a capital gain of over 15 €m. A 
new important strategic initiative that needs to be mentioned is the creation of TIPO (28.75% 
controlled by TIP), a vehicle for investments in top quality micro caps with growth potential 
and willing to be listed on the stock exchange within 3 to 5 years. During the year, TIPO 
acquired a stake in AAA, a pharmaceutical and diagnostic company headquartered in France, 
and in iGuzzini, Italian leading company in the lighting equipment and systems sector. Thanks 
to all these corporate actions, performed to diversify the investments with a mix of high-quality 
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assets, and in combination with the good market performance of the main underlying listed 
assets (Amplifon share price +23% YoY and Interpump share price +36% YoY), TIP has been 
able to create value, proven by a NAV increase of 35.8% compared to the previous year.   
In 2015, TIP continued its process of portfolio diversification with the investments in Hugo 
Boss (0.85% stake), a market leader in the high-end apparel market, and Azimut Benetti 
(11.73% stake), one of the world’s leading private group in the luxury boating sector. As a 
result of these operations, having as target high-quality brands, TIP increased the presence of 
luxury/fashion assets in its portfolio. These investments have been traduced in an increase in 
the value of the portfolio, having NAV registered +9.9% compared to the previous year, always 
supported also by the strong share price performance of all the main underlying listed assets. 
In 2016, TIP’s NAV increased by 21.9% compared to the previous year. This value creation 
has been sustained by the good market performance realized during the year by the listed assets 
in TIP’s portfolio, as well as by the corporate actions undertaken during the year. The most 
important to be mentioned are, first of all, the disposal and monetization of the entire strategic 
investments in Bolzoni and Noemalife, both through OPA launched by industrial partners, 
realizing a total capital gain of about 10 €m. Moreover, during the year, TIP has significantly 
increased its position in Hugo Boss, reaching a 1.28% stake. Another important strategic 
initiative that needs to be mentioned is the creation of Asset Italia (20% stake owned by TIP), 
a vehicle specialized in carrying out structured club deals, giving each shareholder the chance 
to choose, every time a proposal arises, whether to subscribe or not for each individual 
investment. The initiative allows TIP to capitalize on its valuable network of relations with 
Italy’s most important entrepreneurial families and its track record of successful transactions 
over the last few years. 
In 2017, TIP realized a partial disposal (about a third) of its interests in Prysmian and Amplifon, 
while continuing to hold significant stakes compared to the investments originally made, thus 
confirming the positive evaluation of the potential of these companies. Along with these 
operations, TIP also increased its investment in Hugo Boss and Interpump and in June acquired 
a 10% indirect stake (through Asset Italia vehicle) in Alpitour, the leading Italian travel 
operator. Another important strategic initiative is the creation of StarTIP (100% owned by TIP), 
a vehicle specialized in investments in the start-up, digital and innovation fields. The rationale 
behind this operation is to make use of the unique network comprising an entrepreneurial 
shareholder base and a portfolio of excellent companies in order to provide cross-fertilization 
and accelerate the development processes of start-ups and innovative companies in the early 
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stage, which is one of the most promising segment in the venture capital industry but still 
uncovered in Italy by venture capital firms. During the year, the underlying listed assets 
registered an outstanding performance in the market, e.g. looking at the three major assets over 
which almost 50% of total portfolio is concentrated: Interpump (21% of GAV) share price 
+70% YoY, Moncler (18% of GAV) share price +59% YoY and Amplifon (9% of GAV) share 
price +41% YoY. These market dynamics in the listed assets, combined with the corporate 
actions undertaken over the year, allowed TIP to substantially boost the value of its portfolio, 
having NAV registered a 42.5% increase compared to the previous year. 
Summing up, during the considered period, TIP’s NAV registered a significant increase (+23% 
CAGR). After having analysed the NAV evolution over the years, the successful path can be 
considered to be mainly triggered by the corporate strategy that has been implemented. The fast 
portfolio rotation with a constant evaluation of acquisition/disposal opportunities, the unique 
and valuable network of entrepreneurial families with significant industrial know how to scout 
for investments and the portfolio broad diversification – in terms of sector, geography and 
combination of listed and unlisted assets – in high-quality assets have directly been traduced in 
a significant value creation. This extremely dynamic approach in portfolio management has 
also been combined with the remarkably positive market performance of the main underlying 
listed assets, corresponding to an “excellence” recognized by the market, which further 










TIP performance vs.  market 
 
Source: Bloomberg, analysts’ reports and personal re-elaboration. 
If we look at the TIP’s NAV evolution, during the period 2009-2017, NAV increased by 
410.07%, exceptionally outperforming the FTSE Italia All-Shares Index, which increased by 
just 2.28% in the same period.  
The outstanding TIP’s performance over the years in terms of value creation, given by the 
implemented corporate strategy, i.e. the application of an extremely dynamic portfolio 
management approach, allowed TIP to outperform also all the main market indexes. At this 
purpose, we refer to the 5-year performance, as regularly shown in Company’s annual reports. 
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The corporate actions undertaken during the years, in the context of an active portfolio 
management, are directly related to the financial strategy and structure of the company.  
In the analysis of the financial structure policy, the Net Financial Position of the Holding 
company - i.e. Tamburi Investment Partners S.p.A. - has been taken into consideration, as 
reported in the company annual reports. 
  
Source: annual reports. NFP calculated as Cash and cash equivalents – Gross financial debt. 
TIP historically followed quite a prudent and cautious financial strategy, although its financial 
leverage increased and its financial structure became more aggressive between 2013 and 2016, 
with an LTV ratio reaching 25% in 2016, in order to pursue new investment opportunities. In 
2017, we can observe a significant decline in the level of debt (LTV ratio of 12%, halved 
compared to the previous year), thanks to the partial disposals of Prysmian and Amplifon and, 
above all, to the cash inflow of 51 €m coming from the warrants conversion exercised in June.9 
 
 
                                               
9 Warrants are a derivative that give the right, but not the obligation, to buy (call warrants) or sell (put warrants) 
a security at a defined strike price, within an established deadline, at a specific ratio.  
In 2015, TIP issued 36.9 €m 2015-2020 warrants (distributed to shareholders for free) which can be converted at 
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Discount to NAV 
After having investigated, in the previous section, the NAV evolution and the related main 
determinants, we continue with the analysis by considering how the market has changed its 
valuation about TIP during the reference period. Thus, by comparing in each year the market 
capitalization to the NAV, we can study the discount to NAV dynamic and try to understand its 
key factors.  
 
Source: personal calculation 
TIP is characterized by the persistence of a very low discount between its Market Value and 
NAV and this is linked to the characteristics of TIP’s portfolio and its investment strategy, 
which together even allowed the zeroing of the discount to NAV applied by the market in 2017. 
First of all, TIP’s portfolio, through minority stakes investments, is characterized by broad and 
balanced diversification in selected sectors: in 2017, 40% of value is in the luxury/retail industry 
(Moncler, Hugo Boss, Eataly and Azimut Benetti being the main assets), 39% of value is in 
technology sector (Interpump and Prysmian being the main assets) and 16% of value is in the 
healthcare/tourism sectors (Amplifon and Alpitour being the main assets).  
Secondly, and even more important than diversification, the extremely dynamic approach to 
investments: during the 2009-2017 period, the portfolio has been characterized by fast asset 
rotation, with a total of 72 M&A transactions completed and an estimated weighted average 
holding period of 4-5 years. 
Thirdly, the portfolio is characterized by the focus on high-quality assets, featuring forefront 
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balance sheets are also recognized by the market, having the main TIP’s underlying listed assets 
reported strong stock performances during the analysed period. This has then been directly 
reflected also in a progressive re-rating of TIP. Among the few exceptions, it is possible to 
mention BE – Think Solve Execute – for which the market in 2010 did not understand its 
intrinsic value and did not reflect the turnaround effort made by the management in the previous 
12 months, which allowed the company to return to bottom-line profitability.  
Moreover, an important feature of TIP’s portfolio is the prevailing weight of listed companies 
(around 70% of GAV in 2017) or, in any case, of unlisted companies pursuing IPOs, as shown 
in the below figure. This allows TIP to have a highly liquid portfolio of assets, which is a feature 
strongly appreciated by the market.  
 
Source: Company’s presentation (12.03.2018) 
Lastly, the extraordinary managerial performance in value creation, arising from management’s 
role in helping companies in exploiting new opportunities and in accompanying entrepreneurs 
and the management in the process of growth through a real active shareholder approach, needs 
to be mentioned as distinctive TIP’s feature. 
Putting all these things together, over the years, the market has appreciated TIP’s investment 
strategy and has recognized its value creation ability. This has been reflected in an extremely 
high TIP’s stock re-rating (share price +348.6% considering the period 2009-2017) and thus in 
an almost constant low level of the discount to NAV applied, even reaching the zero level in 
2017, i.e. a situation in which the portfolio of assets trade in line with its fair value.  
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Total Shareholder Return 
Total Shareholder Return can be analysed in connection with the performance of the underlying 
assets (listed and not listed) in the holding company’s portfolio and the discount to NAV 
dynamic over the years.  
 
Source: Bloomberg (TSR) and personal re-elaboration 
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Over the period 2009-2017, TIP delivered an annualized TSR of 23.3%, compared to 3.7% 
returned for the FTSE Italia All-Shares Index.  
Assuming an investment value of 100 in 2009, TIP has delivered exceptionally positive returns 
to its shareholders over the years, as the initial investment value continuously increased and 
more than fivefold during the period 2009-2017. This considerably good performance by TIP 
is associated with the investment strategy adopted.  
First of all, the unique network of contacts and the expertise of the management team in 
providing support to the investee companies for exploiting growth opportunities have been 
fundamental elements for boosting the performance of its underlying assets, carefully selected 
by TIP for their excellence in their respective markets. For the purpose of this analysis, referring 
to the period during which the assets are part of the portfolio, only the listed assets have been 
taken into consideration; however, the unlisted assets also have exerted a considerably positive 
influence on the return being delivered, given their growing path and sound operating 
performance. With particular reference to the listed assets having more weight on total TIP’s 
investment portfolio value in 2017, we can immediately recognize the fact that TIP’s delivered 
TSR in the period 2009-2017 has been strongly determined by their performance: Interpump 
delivered a TSR equal to 29.5% in the period 2009-2017, Moncler delivered a TSR equal to 
27.1% in the period 2013-2017 and Amplifon delivered a TSR equal to 20.2% in the period 
2010-2017. 
Moreover, the investment strategy characterized by highly dynamic portfolio management 
approach has been responsible of a substantial value creation over the years, which has also 
been recognized by the market. During the analysed period, we can indeed observe a remarkable 
squeeze of the discount to NAV, which from a level of 18% in 2009 reached the zero level in 
2017. This dynamic in the discount to NAV applied by the market has exerted a positive 




The analysis carried out in the present work with regard to the investment holding companies 
listed on the Italian stock market has allowed to observe the discount to NAV phenomenon. 
The analysis has been conducted for the period 2009-2017 and this time frame allowed to notice 
changes in the discount to NAV level applied by the market from one year to another. Moreover, 
despite the observed persistence of this phenomenon in the analysed sample, the level of the 
discount at which stocks are traded is different in the different holding companies taken into 
consideration. It can be thus deducted that the discount to NAV level is strictly linked to several 
company-specific factors. 
The first element observed to be strongly connected to the discount to NAV level in the analysed 
sample is the ownership concentration, measured considering the ownership % of the first 
largest shareholder. 
 
Source: personal re-elaboration 
Among the holding companies being studied, TIP substantially differs from the others in terms 
of ownership structure. This is due to the fact that Exor, Italmobiliare, CIR and IMMSI are 
holding companies which have been established to diversify the economic interest and keep 
control in the hands of the controlling family at the top of the chain through a cascading 
mechanism; TIP, instead, is owned by a network of several Italian entrepreneurs and family-
owned firms and, similarly to closed-end funds, makes minority stakes investments, as it does 
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Moreover, except for CIR, the other family holding companies do not declare, according to 
Italian group Regulation, to be under the direction and coordination activity of the vehicles 
controlled by the different families. However, considering the relevant presence of controlling 
family members in the Boards, with both executive and non-executive roles, this declared 
separation between control and direction seems to be more apparent than real.   
The ownership concentration is connected to the agency problem, to the risk of expropriation 
of the controlling shareholder at the expenses of the minorities as well as to a perceived low 
transparency in the market. Consequently, as it can be deducted from this analysis, there is a 
strong positive correlation between the ownership concentration and the level of the discount 
to NAV applied by the market. In fact, considering the ownership structure and the discount to 
NAV levels in 2017: TIP is the holding company with the lowest ownership concentration 
(12.65% stake of the first largest shareholder) and discount (zero level), while IMMSI is the 
one with the highest ownership concentration (59.83% stake in the hand of the Colaninno 
family, through the wholly owned company Omniaholding S.p.A. and its subsidiary 
Omniainvest S.p.A.) and discount to NAV (47%). 
From the analysis carried out in this dissertation, another element that turns out to be closely 
connected to the discount to NAV is the portfolio concentration, measured considering the 
weight of the three main assets in GAV.  
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Source: personal re-elaboration.  
Typically holding companies, conglomerates ad multi-divisional firms are characterized by the 
so-called conglomerate discount, i.e. the discount to NAV applied by the market considering 
the implementation risk, the additional complexity and the questioned effective management 
connected to the diversification process.  
In reality, from the analysis conducted in this work, it emerges that diversification allows to 
reduce the risk exposure of the asset portfolio, as the dependence on a single sector of activity 
or a single country is lowered, and this is recognized by the market with a reduction in the 
applied discount to NAV. It is certainly true that over-diversification may lead to difficulties in 
understanding and monitoring the investments, and therefore to a reduction in the value of the 
portfolio, but it is important not to consider diversification per se, given that all actually depends 
on management and asset quality.  
During the analysed period, Exor, Italmobiliare and TIP have increased the diversification of 
their portfolio, both in terms of sectors and geography, along with a rationalization of minor 
non-core assets when they did not fit the company’s strategy anymore. This portfolio reshuffle 
process performed during 2009-2017 period ended in a reduction of portfolio concentration, 
which has been rewarded by the market with a decrease in the applied discount to NAV. In CIR 
and IMMSI, instead, comparing the portfolios in 2009 and 2017, an increased portfolio 
concentration can be observed as well as the highest levels of discount to NAV.  
A particularly interest case is TIP. It is the most diversified holding (the three most important 
assets in its portfolio represent about 48% of GAV in 2017, compared to a range of 70-90% for 



















Weight three main assets in GAV
Italian Holdings - Portfolio concentration vs Discount to NAV (2017)
 104 
selected high-growth potential sectors and in high-quality assets, featuring forefront positions 
in their respective markets. So, we can consider TIP a notable example of the fact that 
management ability in selecting high-quality assets compensates for high diversification and 
this is also recognized by the market, which applies a low discount to NAV (TIP’s discount 
even reached the zero level in 2017).   
Maintaining the focus on the holding companies’ portfolios composition, an aspect which 
turned out not to be strongly related to the level of the discount to NAV is the portfolio liquidity, 
measured considering the average percentage of listed assets on GAV during the 2009-2017 
period. 
 
Source: personal re-elaboration. 
The portfolio liquidity, guaranteed by the presence of a high percentage of listed assets, is a 
feature usually appreciated by the market but it is also important to balance the portfolio with 
investments in unlisted assets. In fact, having unlisted assets in the portfolio allows shareholders 
to access and having exposure to these private businesses investing in the holding companies’ 
shares while a portfolio entirely composed of listed assets would be easy to replicate through 
direct investment and the investor will find it useful to own the holding only when the discount 
is sufficiently appealing. In selecting the unlisted assets to invest on, holding companies should 
always pay attention to the quality and visibility of these assets, as these are the two main figures 
to guarantee a recognition of their value in the market.  
Considering the average percentage of listed assets on GAV (for this purpose it is always 
important to bear in mind that the percentage may be affected by the different valuation methods 
used for valuing unlisted assets) and the average discount to NAV in the 2009-2017 period, in 
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reality, it can be inferred that it is not the portfolio liquidity per se, but a balanced portfolio with 
a portion of high-quality and high-visibility unlisted assets that is inversely correlated to the 
level of the discount to NAV applied by the market. In this regard, in the considered sample, 
TIP is an interesting case. Its portfolio is characterized by a prevailing weight of listed assets, 
with an average (about 70%) which is almost in line with that of the other peers in the sample 
(excluding CIR), but it has also a portion of “excellent” unlisted assets in their respective sectors 
and with high visibility in the market, also given by their expected IPOs. This portfolio 
composition seems to be strongly appreciated by the market, which rewards TIP by applying 
the lowest level of average discount to NAV (13%) compared to its peers. 
In the light of this analysis, the investment style can be considered a strongly determining factor 
for value creation and for the recognition of such value by the market, manifested through the 
application of a lower discount to NAV. 
 
Source: personal re-elaboration. 
During the analysed period, TIP is the holding which demonstrated the highest level of activism 
in managing its portfolio, performing continuous and well-focused acquisition and divestment 
operations. This dynamism is visible looking at TIP’s portfolio rotation, characterized by an 
estimated weighted average holding period for the investments of 4-5years. The adoption of 
this active approach allowed TIP to extraordinarily increase the value of its portfolio during the 
period (NAV +410%) and this has been also rewarded by the market with a strong re-rating of 
TIP’s stocks (market cap +520% over the same period) and, consequently, with very low levels 
of applied discount to NAV, which even reached the zero level in 2017.   
Exor also applied a quite active approach in managing its portfolio, especially in the period 
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sector and the spin-off of Ferrari. Exor benefitted from the application of this dynamic 
investment style, registering a considerable increase in the value of its portfolio (NAV +222%) 
and a strong re-rating of its stocks (market cap +259% over the same period) and, consequently, 
reporting the lowest average level of the discount to NAV applied by the market (about 34% in 
the 2009-2017 period) compared to the discount applied to the other family holding companies 
in the sample. 
IMMSI, on the contrary, is the holding company in the sample which operated applying the 
most passive investment style, with no strategic investment or disposal operations to reshuffle 
and optimize its portfolio. This passivity resulted in a reduction in the value of its portfolio 
(NAV -22%) and in the application of very high levels of discount to NAV by the market 
(average discount of 58% in the 2009-2017 period).  
From the analysis presented in this work it is therefore deductible that a holding company with 
a passive investment style deserves a higher discount to NAV compared to one dynamically 
managing its portfolio as the former will be an appealing investment only when the discount to 
NAV is sufficient to be worth taking the risk of being passive. 
The last element which turned out to be significantly related to the level of the discount to NAV 
is the managerial performance, measured considering the delivered historical TSR as a good 
proxy, although no guarantee, of future performance.  
 
Source: personal re-elaboration. 
When investing in a holding company, the capabilities of the management team to deliver 
outperformance are elements significantly important to consider. In this regard, in the light of 
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management team realized an extraordinary performance in scouting new value-creating 
investments and in helping investee companies in exploiting new opportunities, thus 
accompanying entrepreneurs and the management in the process of growth. This remarkable 
management expertise allowed TIP to deliver an annualized TSR equal to 23.3% for the 2009-
2017 period and the market expressed its confidence in the management team’s capability of 
continuing to create value in the future by eliminating the applied discount to NAV in 2017. 
On the contrary, CIR and IMMSI delivered a negative annualized TSR over the 2009-2017 
period (-4.0% and -0.0% respectively). The market considered this poor performance as a signal 
of potential non-value creation also for the future and therefore penalized these two holding 
companies applying in 2017 the highest levels of discount to NAV registered in the sample 
(39% and 47% respectively). 
Summing up, the analysis conducted in this work allowed to observe that the discount to NAV 
is not a phenomenon that indiscriminately regards all the investment holding companies, as it 
is strictly connected to several company’s specific factors. In particular, from this study, 
emerges a positive correlation of the discount to NAV level with ownership concentration and 
portfolio concentration and an inverse correlation of the discount to NAV level with active 
investment style and positive past managerial performance. 
In the light of the discount to NAV phenomenon, holding companies represent an interesting 
investment opportunity. In fact, given the discount to NAV at which holdings’ stocks are traded 
in the market, investors have the unique chance to exploit this evaluative imperfection of the 
market and access a portfolio of assets at a price which is lower than its fair value, therefore 
having a portion of the portfolio basically for free. When considering a possible investment, 
investors take into consideration the holding’s delivered TSR, as it is the measure of the value 
created over time by the company for its shareholders. In order to maximize the benefit arising 
from this evaluative imperfection of the market, an investor should favour companies that trade 
at large discount and have high TSR.  
In this regard, considering the sample of holding companies analysed within this work, the most 
interesting case is represented by Exor, which allowed investors to realize a high return 
(annualized TSR equal to 19.6% for the 2009-2017 period) by exploiting a high discount to 
NAV (average discount level equal to 34% over the same period).  
However, Italmobiliare and TIP can also be mentioned as valuable cases. In particular, 
Italmobiliare allowed investors to benefit from a higher average discount to NAV level 
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compared to Exor (39% in the 2009-2017 period) but delivered a modest return (annualized 
TSR equal to 6.9% for the 2009-2017 period). TIP represents instead a very special case of 
holding company in the considered sample. Given TIP’s proven value creation ability shown 
over time thanks to the corporate strategy adopted for managing its portfolio, it allowed 
investors to realize a considerably high return (annualized TSR equal to 23.3% for the 2009-
2017 period) while exploiting a modest discount to NAV (average discount level equal to 13% 
over the same period, even reaching the zero level in 2017) because of the actual recognition 
of its value from the market.  
 
Source: personal re-elaboration  
Finally, for the sake of completeness, it is necessary to mention that there is a risk that the 
results of the analysis conducted in this work could have been closely idiosyncratic of particular 
cases. It could therefore be appropriate to conduct an econometric verification on a larger 
sample, also including European and worldwide holding companies, and to consider a wider 
time frame in order to guarantee the generalizability of the obtained results, notwithstanding 
that they could be valid only for the listed holding companies within the Italian context, given 
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